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ABSTRACT 
 While it is currently uncertain whether or not a Canadian orphan drug policy will be 
given further consideration any time in the near future, this thesis seeks to consider the potential 
impact that three different orphan drug incentives could be expected to have in Canada. 
Specifically, market exclusivity, priority review vouchers, and a tax credit for orphan drug 
development are evaluated. This thesis is primarily informed by the literature about how orphan 
drug incentives operate in the United States. Admittedly, there is controversy about whether 
orphan drug policies in their current form are justifiable. This controversy is discussed, with this 
thesis proceeding on the basis that morality and a commitment to equality validate providing 
some form of orphan drug incentive(s) in Canada. That being said, it is unclear how exactly 
“orphan drug” should be defined and, accordingly, what criteria should govern the allocation of 
incentives. Market exclusivity appears to be effective at encouraging investment in orphan drugs 
and therefore it is recommended that the incentive be implemented in Canada in order to 
encourage foreign drug companies to obtain market authorisation from Health Canada for orphan 
drugs.  Priority review voucher programs are still in their infancy and, therefore, it is difficult to 
make any strong assertions about the effect and impact of these programs. It is nevertheless not 
recommended that vouchers be introduced in Canada because it is unlikely that priority review 
here will be sufficiently valuable to have an impact. An orphan drug-specific tax credit offers a 
convenient means of subsidizing orphan drug development without being expected to be overly 
costly, given the narrow parameters within which the credit would operate. Therefore, a 
Canadian tax credit for orphan drug development is also recommended.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 A number of jurisdictions have developed policies that are designed to meet the needs of 
patients with orphan diseases. To date, policymakers in Canada have refrained from enacting an 
orphan drug policy. A Canadian orphan disease policy was proposed but ultimately rejected in 
1997,
1
 and in 2012 a draft framework for a Canadian orphan drug policy was under discussion.
2
 
Renewed interest in implementing an orphan drug framework was later expressed and, at least 
until recently,
3
 Health Canada said it was considering how to amend the Food and Drug 
Regulations in order “to encourage the development of orphan drugs (i.e., drugs for rare 
diseases) and increase the availability of these products on the Canadian market.”4  
 Rare disease and orphan disease are often used interchangeably, to indicate a disease that 
affects only a small number of people. The term “orphan” refers to the fact that these diseases 
have historically been neglected, or “orphaned”, by the pharmaceutical industry, resulting in 
patients having few to no available treatment options.
5
 There is no globally-agreed upon 
definition of rare disease, though the definitions used by legislators typically take account of the 
number of patients who are affected by a particular disease but may also include factors such as 
the severity of the disease and the existence of adequate treatments.
6
 Canada’s 2012 proposed 
orphan drug legislation would have defined a rare disease as “a life-threatening, seriously 
debilitating, or serious and chronic condition affecting a relatively small number of patients (less 
than 1 in 2, 000).”7 An orphan drug is a drug that is intended to treat, prevent, or diagnose an 
orphan disease.  
                                                          
1
 Pedro Franco, “Orphan Drugs: The Regulatory Environment” (2013) 18 Drug Discovery Today 
163 at 165.  
2
 Office of Legislative and Regulatory Modernization, Initial Draft Discussion Document for a 
Canadian Orphan Drug Regulatory Framework, (13 December 2012). 
3
 See e.g. Maura Forrest, “Health Canada gives ‘kiss of death’ to planned policy for rare-disease 
drugs” National Post (16 October 2017), online: National Post http://nationalpost.com. 
4
 At the date of writing, it is unclear whether, or in what form, this initiative will be pursued. 
5
 Franco, supra note 1 at 163. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Office of Legislative and Regulatory Modernization, supra note 2 at 4.  
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 In countries with orphan drug policies, a pharmaceutical company can typically access 
significant incentives if it can obtain orphan drug designation for its drug. Some of these 
incentives have been in place for a number of years and have been the subject of considerable 
discussion. In 2007 an interesting and novel incentive for neglected tropical diseases was 
introduced in the United States: priority review vouchers (“PRVs”).8  PRVs are awarded for 
eligible drugs upon receiving approval from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and can 
be redeemed in order to have a second, different drug subject to FDA’s priority review process.9 
The use of vouchers as an incentive for drug development was subsequently expanded to 
encourage the development of treatments for rare pediatric diseases.
10
 Vouchers are a unique 
incentive for drug development and have been the subject of much speculation about their 
efficacy.
11
 Being such a recent addition to the existing orphan drug incentives, the impact of 
PRVs on behaviour has yet to be determined.  
 As a Canadian orphan drug policy, until recently, was the subject of renewed attention 
and apparent changes in policy direction, an assessment of potential incentives and the issues 
associated with them is timely and would be of value. This thesis considers three potential 
incentives for orphan drug development in Canada, and analyzes whether it would be reasonable 
to expect the incentives to have an impact in terms of increasing access to rare disease treatments 
in Canada. The ultimate goal of orphan drug policy is to improve the lives and well-being of 
patients with rare diseases;
12
 this can be accomplished by encouraging the development of 
                                                          
8
 See e.g. Emily Waltz, “FDA Launches Priority Vouchers for Neglected-Disease Drugs” (2008) 
26 Nature Biotechnology 1315. 
9
 21 USC § 360n (2010). 
10
 21 USC § 360ff (2012). 
11
 See e.g. Cameron Graham Arnold & Thomas Pogge, “Improving the Incentives of the FDA 
Voucher Program for Neglected Tropical Diseases” (2015) 21 Brown J World Affairs 224; 
Aaron S Kesselheim, Lara R Maggs & Ameet Sarpatwari, “Experience With the Priority Review 
Voucher Program for Drug Development” (2015) 314 JAMA 1687; Andrew S Robertson et al, 
“The Impact of the US Priority Review Voucher on Private- Sector Investment in Global Health 
Research and Development” (2012) 6 PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases e1750;  Joel Lexchin, 
“One Step Forward, One Step Sideways? Expanding Research Capacity for Neglected Diseases” 
(2010) 10 BMC International Health & Human Rights 20 [Lexchin, “One Step Forward”].  
12
 See e.g. CORD, Our Work, online: Canadian Organization for Rare Disorders 
www.raredisorders.ca. 
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appropriate treatments and promoting access to those drugs.
13
 This thesis is based on the 
understanding that encouraging more investment in the development of orphan products should 
be a secondary goal, and that the primary objective of a Canadian orphan drug framework should 
be to facilitate access to approved treatments for patients with rare diseases. To elaborate, while 
it would likely be ideal from a public policy perspective if Canadian companies would invest in 
more research and development (“R&D”) for orphan drugs,14 increasing access to treatments is a 
matter of greater importance and urgency, regardless of where the treatments have been 
developed.   
 Specifically, the following three incentives are evaluated in this thesis: market 
exclusivity, PRVs, and a tax credit for orphan drug development. Market exclusivity is an 
incentive that is frequently provided in orphan drug policies, and was included in the 2012 Draft 
Discussion Document for a Canadian orphan drug framework.
15
 PRVs, as mentioned above, are 
a relatively novel incentive initially introduced in the United States in 2007 for neglected tropical 
diseases and subsequently expanded to include rare pediatric diseases.
16
 Tax expenditures, such 
as tax credits, are commonly used to promote valuable policy objectives,
17
 and the United States 
has provided an orphan drug-specific income tax credit for qualified clinical trials costs of 
designated orphan drugs.
18
 Market exclusivity and PRVs are both examples of “pull” (or 
“revenue-side”) incentives, in the sense that they reward successful R&D activity, while tax 
credits for orphan drug development expenses subsidize the costs of doing R&D and are 
therefore considered a “push” (or “supply-side”) type of incentive.19  
  The goal of this thesis is to assess how well these incentives for orphan drug 
development can be expected to function in Canada. Much of the thesis will focus on the 
literature about how orphan drug incentives operate in the United States, with some 
                                                          
13
 Orphan Drug Act, Pub L No 97-414, § 1, 96 Stat 2049 at 2049 (1983) (codified as amended at 
21 USC § 360aa (2010)). 
14
 See below, at 31-32, for further discussion about the goals of orphan drug incentives in 
Canada.   
15
 Office of Legislative and Regulatory Modernization, supra note 2 at 25.  
16
 Supra notes 9, 10.  
17
 See e.g. Department of Finance Canada, 2017 Report on Federal Tax Expenditures, (Ottawa: 
FIN, 2017) online: FIN https://www.fin.gc.ca/fin-eng.asp at 6. 
18
 26 USC § 45C (2010).  
19
 See e.g. David B Ridley, Henry G Grabowski & Jeffrey L Moe, “Developing Drugs for 
Developing Countries” (2006) 25 Health Affairs 313 at 316-17. 
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consideration given to how the European orphan drug framework differs. While other 
jurisdictions have also introduced their own orphan drug policies, the United States has 
historically led the way with respect to orphan drug policy and, accordingly, a large bulk of the 
literature focuses on the United States’ Orphan Drug Act (“ODA”)20 and related orphan drug 
incentives.  
 This thesis is organized as follows: background information about the challenges 
particular to orphan disease drug development and how these have been addressed in various 
jurisdictions is provided in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 provides a succinct description of the competing 
arguments with respect to whether allocating resources to provide orphan drug incentives is 
justified. Without seeking to address all arguments on the subject, the Chapter concludes with the 
finding that providing some form of incentives to developers of orphan drugs is good public 
policy. Three incentives are then evaluated and assessed in Chapters 4-6. Market exclusivity is 
evaluated in Chapter 4, and this discussion leads to the conclusion that Canadian policymakers 
should offer exclusivity protection in order to encourage companies to market their orphan drugs 
here. Chapter 5 assesses the PRVs programs as they are currently being used in the United States 
and, while it is ostensibly too early to really understand the impact that vouchers may have, the 
incentive is likely to generate too great of a burden on Health Canada and in any event, the value 
of a priority review voucher in Canada is unlikely to be sufficiently valuable to have an impact. 
Finally, using the tax system to facilitate orphan drug development is considered in Chapter 6, 
leading to the conclusion that an orphan drug-specific tax credit should be used in conjunction 
with market exclusivity in order to lower the costs of developing drugs for rare diseases. A 
summary of the conclusions and recommendations is provided in Chapter 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 21 USC § 360aa-360ee (2010). 
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CHAPTER 2: ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF PATIENTS WITH ORPHAN DISEASES   
2.1  Challenges with Orphan Drug Development 
 As a commercial enterprise, one can reasonably predict that pharmaceutical companies 
will prefer to invest in “R&D” activities that are likely to yield a generous profit. A significant 
disincentive to developing treatments for rare diseases already exists.
21
 Rare diseases, by 
definition, provide only a small pool of potential buyers, making it unlikely that a rare disease 
treatment will be very profitable. As a result, rare diseases have been historically given less 
attention and were considered to be “orphaned” by the pharmaceutical industry.22  
 The perceived lack of profitability of orphan drug development is likely exacerbated by 
additional challenges that may be faced by orphan drug developers. Orphan drugs are held to the 
same standards of quality, safety, and efficacy as other drugs,
23
 therefore drug developers must 
be able to produce the same level of clinical support for a rare disease treatment that would be 
required for the approval of any other treatment.
24
 Further challenges particular to developing 
treatments for rare diseases include insufficient information about the natural course of many 
rare diseases, frequent late diagnosis of patients, and a lack of validated clinical end points by 
                                                          
21
 Franco, supra note 1 at 163. 
22
 Ibid. See also Orphan Drug Act, supra note 13, § 1. 
23
 See e.g. M Orfali et al, “Raising Orphans: How Clinical Development Programs of Drugs for 
Rare and Common Diseases Are Different” (2012) 92 Nature 262 at 262. 
24
 That being said, there is a degree of flexibility that the regulatory authorities may permit in 
terms of the type of evidence used to support a marketing application. See e.g. Aaron S 
Kesselheim, Jessica A Myers & Jerry Avorn, “Characteristics of Clinical Trials to Support 
Approval of Orphan vs Nonorphan Drugs for Cancer” (2011) 305 JAMA 2320 at 2324 (pivotal 
trials for orphan cancer treatments are significantly less likely to be randomized or blinded, and 
significantly more likely to use a surrogate outcome to demonstrate a drug’s efficacy than trials 
for non-orphan cancer treatments); Aaron S Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, “Clinical Trials of 
Orphan Drugs for Cancer—Reply” (2011) 306 JAMA 1545 at 1546 (the flexibility granted for 
orphan drug clinical trials has resulted in a lower standard being applied to clinical trial design). 
Nevertheless, the same safety and efficacy standards apply to both orphan and non-orphan drugs. 
See e.g. Jun Mitsumoto et al, “Pivotal Studies of Orphan Drugs Approved for Neurological 
Diseases” (2009) 66 Ann Neurol 184 at 188.  
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which the efficacy of a treatment can be tested.
25
 Assuming that sufficient information can be 
obtained so as to allow a potential treatment to be developed, drug developers may also have 
practical challenges to confront when conducting the necessary clinical trials for rare disease 
treatments. Rarity of a disease means that there are far less patients available to participate in 
clinical trials
26
 and therefore orphan drug developers can find it difficult to recruit a sufficient 
number of participants.
27
 Furthermore, within a given jurisdiction, the patients with a specific 
rare disease are likely to be fairly widely dispersed. Conducting clinical trials with participants 
who are geographically spread out creates additional difficulties.
28
 As a result, it can be 
especially time consuming and expensive to conduct the tests required to support a marketing 
application for an orphan drug,
29
 though it should be noted that not everyone agrees that orphan 
drug development is necessarily more expensive.
30
 If orphan drugs are particularly unprofitable 
for pharmaceutical companies to invest in,
31
 they may be unlikely to be developed without 
additional incentives. High R&D costs combined with a small market would result in what 
economists would classify as a market failure, where companies will not invest in orphan drugs 
at a rate that is sufficient from the point of view of society because it will not be sufficiently 
profitable to do so.
32
 Government interventions are often validated by the need to address such 
                                                          
25
 Erik Tambuyzer, “Rare Diseases, Orphan Drugs and Their Regulation: Questions and 
Misconceptions” (2010) 9 Nature Reviews 921 at 923. 
26
 Charles Oo & Lorraine M Rusch, “A Personal Perspective of Orphan Drug Development for 
Rare Diseases: A Golden Opportunity or An Unsustainable Future?” (2016) 56 J Clin 
Pharmacology 257 at 257. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Roberta Joppi, Vittorio Bertele & Silvio Garattini, “Orphan Drug Development is Progressing 
Too Slowly” (2006) 61 Brit J of Clin Pharmacology 355 at 360. 
30
 See e.g. Kiran N Meekings, Cory S M Williams & John E Arrowsmith, “Orphan Drug 
Development: An Economically Viable Strategy for Biopharma R&D” (2012) 17 Drug Discov 
Today 660. 
31
 Franco, supra note 1 at 165. 
32
 See generally Kenneth Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention” in Universities-National Bureau, ed, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: 
Economic and Social Factors (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962) 609 for a 
discussion of how “classic market failure theory” supports the need for governments to provide 
incentives in order to encourage socially valuable innovation to occur at a sufficient rate. 
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market failures.
33
 These are the concerns that motivated the implementation of orphan drug 
policies in other jurisdictions.  
 Some authors have suggested that without the incentives for orphan drugs many existing 
treatments for rare diseases would not have been developed.
34
 On the other hand, concerns have 
been expressed about the extent of generosity of the incentives offered and the potential for 
abuse of orphan drug legislation.
35
 These criticisms generally do not object to the existence of 
incentives, but, rather, their implementation, where it has been suggested that the costs of 
providing incentives may not be sufficiently justified by improvements in health outcomes.
36
 
Still, others do argue that there is no longer a need for orphan drug policies in their current form 
because being “rare” does not necessarily equate to being neglected by the pharmaceutical 
industry.
37
 These criticisms will be discussed in greater detail below, in Chapter 3.  
2.2  Orphan Drug Policy Landscape 
 Orphanet, an initiative devoted to providing high-quality information about rare diseases, 
defines “orphan drugs” as “drugs that are not developed by the pharmaceutical industry for 
economic reasons but which respond to public health need.”38 This definition is generally 
consistent with the spirit of orphan drug policies, however the specific criteria required to qualify 
as an orphan drug differ by jurisdiction.  As discussed above, there are a number of difficulties 
associated with R&D of treatments for rare diseases. In recognition of these particular challenges 
the United States introduced legislation in 1983 that was intended to promote the development 
and market availability of rare disease treatments.
39
 Australia, Singapore, Japan, the European 
                                                          
33
 Orphan Drug Act, supra note 13, § 1. 
34
 See e.g. Richard Y Cheung, Jillian C Cohen & Patricia Illingworth, “Orphan Drug Policies: 
Implications for the United States, Canada, and Developing Countries” (2004) 12 Health LJ 183 
at 185-86. 
35
 See e.g. David Loughnot, “Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and 
Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?” (2005) 31 Am J L & Med 365 at 
366. 
36
 See e.g. Aaron S Kesselheim, “An Empirical Review of Major Legislation Affecting Drug 
Development: Past Experiences, Effects, and Unintended Consequences” (2011) 89 Milbank Q 
450 at 469 [Kesselheim, “An Empirical Review”].  
37
 See e.g. Matthew Herder, “When Everyone is an Orphan: Against Adopting a U.S.-Styled 
Orphan Drug Policy in Canada” (2013) 20 Accountability in Research 227at 243 [Herder, 
“When Everyone is an Orphan”]. 
38
 What is an Orphan Drug?, online: http://www.orpha.net. 
39
 Ibid; Orphan Drug Act, supra note 13, § 1. 
8 
 
Union and Taiwan followed suit in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1999 and 2000, respectively.
40
 In Canada, 
proposed orphan drug legislation was rejected as being unnecessary in 1997.
41
 This section 
provides an overview of how each of these other jurisdictions has addressed the problems 
associated with orphan drug development as well as a discussion about the current status of 
orphan drug policy in Canada. The incentives available through orphan drug schemes will be 
briefly described here, with greater detail being provided in Chapters 4-6.  
2.2.1  United States 
 Orphan drug policy in the United States is primarily based in the Orphan Drug Act 
(“ODA”),42 enacted in 1983 in response to concerns that pharmaceutical companies were 
unlikely to develop treatments for rare diseases in the absence of incentives,
43
 though a number 
of other policy instruments supplement the ODA by also facilitating orphan drug development.
44
 
Under the ODA, a sponsor may apply for its drug to be granted orphan drug designation at any 
time throughout the drug development process.
45
 Orphan drugs are defined under the ODA as 
drugs that are intended to treat a rare disease.
46
 In the United States a “rare disease” is a disease 
or a condition that “affects less than 200,000 persons in United States” or one that affects more 
than 200,000 persons but for which “there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of 
developing and making available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be 
recovered from sales in the United States.”47 Orphan status confers a number of benefits for drug 
developers including guidance from the FDA about the clinical testing and regulatory review 
                                                          
40
 Franco, supra note 1 at 165. Australia’s legislation was revised in 1989 to include some 
incentive for orphan drug development, however, the full orphan drug framework was not 
implemented until 1997. 
41
 Ibid at 165. 
42
 Supra note 13. 
43
 See e.g. Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, The Orphan 
Drug Act Implementation and Impact, (OEI-09-00-00380) (May 2001) available online: 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00380.pdf at 4. 
44
 E.g. Rare Diseases Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-280, 116 Stat 1988 (codified at 42 USC § 281 
(2010).  
45
 21 CFR § 316.23(b) (2011).  
46
 21 CFR § 316.3(b)(10) (2013).   
47
 21 USC § 360aa (2010). See also Loughnot, supra note 35 at 376 (the “prevalence-based” 
definition was not in the originally enactment of the ODA but was subsequently added in 
response to concerns expressed by the pharmaceutical industry about the difficulties associated 
with demonstrating “no reasonable expectation”).  
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process.
48
 Market authorisation (or regulatory approval), refers to the authorisation that is 
granted by the drug regulatory agency and is necessary in order to legally make a drug product 
available for public use. Clinical trial results demonstrating that product is a safe and effective 
treatment for its indicated use are needed in order to obtain regulatory approval. As in all 
jurisdictions discussed in this section, orphan drug designation does not exempt a treatment from 
needing to obtain regulatory approval prior to being marketed to the public.
49
 Rather, orphan 
drug designation permits access to a number of incentives that are designed to facilitate the 
development and marketing of orphan drugs. In order to access the incentives associated with 
orphan status a company must have its product designated as an orphan drug prior to market 
approval being obtained.
50
  
 Under the ODA, a sponsor receives exclusive approval (i.e. market exclusivity) once its 
designated orphan drug has been approved for market.
51
 Market exclusivity is granted for a drug 
only in relation to the specific indication (or use) for which orphan designation of the drug was 
granted and operates by preventing the FDA from approving another sponsor’s marketing 
application for the same drug for the same indication for seven years.
52
 Additional seven-year 
periods of exclusivity can be obtained if the drug is subsequently approved as a treatment for 
another orphan indication.
53
 Market exclusivity can be “broken” in favour of a new orphan 
product that is essentially the same drug intended for the same indication but which demonstrates 
clinical superiority (i.e. is safer, more effective, or significantly more convenient to administer 
                                                          
48
 21 CFR § 316.12(a) (2011) provides that “FDA will provide the sponsor with written 
recommendations concerning the nonclinical laboratory studies and clinical investigations 
necessary for approval of a marketing application if none of the reasons described in §316.14 for 
refusing to do so applies”. 
49
 That being said, the FDA has permitted flexibility with respect to how clinical trials for orphan 
drugs are designed, as noted above, at note 24.   
50
 Orphan Drug Regulations, 21 CFR § 316.23 (2011).  
51
 21 CFR § 316.31(a) (2011).  
52
 Ibid. 
53
 21 CFR § 316.31(b) (2011). 
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than the first orphan drug),
54
 in circumstances where the original orphan product can no longer 
be supplied in sufficient quantities, or otherwise by consent of the market exclusivity holder. 
55
  
 Market exclusivity is considered the primary incentive available for orphan drug 
development in the United States;
56
 however a number of other incentives and means of 
regulatory assistance also exist to facilitate orphan disease R&D activity and to assist sponsors 
with navigating the approval process. For example, the application fee normally required when 
submitting a New Drug Application (“NDA”) is waived for orphan products under the ODA.57  
The ODA also permits direct funding to be provided for orphan drug R&D, the recipients of 
which are determined according to a (competitive) applications process.
58
 The Orphan Drug Tax 
Credit is a non-refundable credit that can be claimed for qualified clinical trials costs incurred in 
the development of designated orphan drugs and is equal to 50 percent of the costs incurred.
59
  
 Since the implementation of the ODA, other orphan drug incentives have been introduced 
that supplement the Act. As mentioned above, PRVs were introduced in 2012 under the Food 
and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (“FDASIA”) as an additional financial 
incentive to encourage the development of treatments for rare pediatric diseases.
60
 Initially 
proposed as an incentive to promote the development of treatments for neglected tropical 
diseases,
61
 under the FDASIA, PRVs may be awarded to a drug sponsor who obtains marketing 
approval for a rare pediatric disease drug.
62
 A PRV entitles the holder to have a subsequent NDA 
                                                          
54
 See generally 21 USC § 360aa-360dd (2010). See also 21 CFR § 316.3(b)(3) (2013); Carolyne 
Hathaway, John Manthei & Cassie Scherer, “Exclusivity Strategies in the United States and 
European Union”, Update (May/June 2009) 34, online: Food and Drug Law Institute 
https://www.fdli.org/ at 36. 
55
 21 CRF § 316.31(a)(3)-(4) (2013).  
56
 Office of Inspector General, supra note 43 at 8 (“market exclusivity...remains the most 
powerful incentive in the Orphan Drug Act”); Sinead M Murphy et al, “Unintended Effects of 
Orphan Product Designation for Rare Neurological Diseases” (2012) 72 Ann Neurol 481 at 482. 
57
 FDA, Designating an Orphan Product: Drugs and Biological Products, online: US Food and 
Drug Administration http://www.fda.gov.  
58
 21 USC § 360ee (2010); Franco, supra note 1 at 167.  
59
 Office of Inspector General, supra note 43 at 7.  
60
 Alexander Gaffney, Michael Mezher & Zachary Brennan, “Regulatory Explainer: Everything 
You Need to Know About FDA’s Priority Review Vouchers” (2 October 2017), online: 
Regulatory Affairs Professionals Society < http://www.raps.org>.  
61
 Ridley, Grabowski & Moe, supra note 19 at 313. 
62
 Pub L No 112-144, § 908, 126 Stat 993at 1094 (2012) (codified as amended at 21 USC § 360ff 
(2015)) [“FDASIA”].  
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for a different drug product be subject to priority review.
63
 Priority review can permit a 
pharmaceutical company to obtain market approval more quickly than if the drug had undergone 
standard review, thereby increasing a drug’s profitability.64 The value of a voucher is likely to be 
maximized when it can be redeemed for a potential “blockbuster drug” that would not be eligible 
for priority review on its own merits.
65
 Vouchers can also be transferred indefinitely (i.e., sold) 
to another party.
66
 
 Overall, the ODA is considered to be a very successful piece of legislation.
67
 Since the 
introduction of the ODA in the United States there have been significant increases in market 
approvals for rare disease treatments,
68
 from 2 in 1983 to 49 in 2014,
69
 up to a total of 637 
approvals for orphan products as of September 2017.
70
 According to the FDA “the Orphan Drug 
Act has unquestionably stimulated the development of drugs for rare diseases.”71 The ODA has 
been hailed as “one of the most successful health-care laws that has been passed in the late 
twentieth century” 72 because it has directly resulted in greater availability of approved 
treatments for patients with orphan diseases. This success has also been credited with 
encouraging the implementation of orphan drug policies in other jurisdictions.
73
  
 Nevertheless, while assessments of the ODA are generally positive, questions have been 
raised about whether the incentives being provided are more generous than necessary to promote 
                                                          
63
 Ibid. Vouchers can be used for any drug, including non-orphan drugs.  
64
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65
 Ridley, Grabowski & Moe, supra note 19 at 314-15 (“blockbuster drugs” are drugs whose 
sales reach $1 billion within five years of being on the market). 
66
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67
 See e.g. Kurt R Karst, “The 2014 Numbers Are In: FDA’s Orphan Drug Program Shatters 
Records” (15 February 2015, online: FDA LawBlog www.fdalawblog.net.   
68
 See e.g. Cheung, Cohen & Illingworth, supra note 34 at 184.  
69
 Karst, supra note 67. 49 is the current record for number of orphan drugs approved by the 
FDA in one year. As with drug approvals, requests for orphan drug designation has steadily risen 
over the years, with the FDA receiving 582 requests in 2016 (the agency granted 333 orphan 
designations that year).  
70
 FDA, Search Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals, online: US Food & Drug 
Administration https://www.accessdata.fda.gov.  
71
 Office of Inspector General, supra note 43 at 7.  
72
 Marlene E Haffner, Janet Whitley & Marie Moses, “Two Decades of Orphan Product 
Development” (2002) 1 Nature 821 at 823. 
73
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rare disease treatment development.
74
 These questions are closely related to the high prices for 
many orphan drugs,
75
  which prompt further inquiries about whether orphan drug legislation has 
been truly effective in terms of facilitating access to treatment.
76
 It is also noted that roughly 
95% of orphan diseases still do not have any approved treatments,
77
 and many of the treatments 
that have been approved to date provide only symptomatic relief with no evidence that they slow 
the progression of the disease process.
78
 Access and availability of treatments for rare diseases 
are, therefore, both perceived as problems that have not been fully addressed by orphan drug 
incentives. Furthermore, the effectiveness of PRVs, which require the FDA to allocate additional 
resources in order to perform a priority review, is generally considered to be uncertain.
79
 These 
concerns form the basis for the following assessment, in Chapters 4-6, of orphan drug incentives.  
2.2.2  European Union 
 European Union orphan disease legislation, introduced in 1995 following the apparent 
success of the ODA in the United States, was largely modelled on the ODA
80
 but with a few key 
differences that were probably intended to address some of the problems perceived with that Act. 
One important difference is that the European Union Regulations take disease severity and the 
existence of previously approved treatments into consideration when determining orphan status. 
Orphan drug designation may be granted for medicinal products intended for the diagnosis, 
prevention or treatment of either a “life-threatening or chronically debilitating condition” that 
                                                          
74
 See e.g. David C Babaian, “Adopting Pharmacogenomics and Parenting Repurposed 
Molecules under the Orphan Drug Act: A Cost Dilemma?” (2014) 13 J Marshall Rev IPL 667 at 
668. 
75
 See e.g. Cheung, Cohen & Illingworth, supra note 34 at 191, 197. 
76
 See e.g. Ashish Kumar Kakkar &  Neha Dahiya, “The Evolving Drug Development 
Landscape: From Blockbusters to Niche Busters in the Orphan Drug Space” (2014) 75 Drug 
Development Research 231 at 232. See also Office of Legislative and Regulatory Modernization, 
supra note 2 at 7 (where it has been pointed out that of the 2661 drugs granted orphan 
designation from 1983 to 2012 only 408 were approved for market). 
77
 Christopher D Moen, “Helping “Orphans” Grow: Fostering Rare Disease Drug Development” 
(2015) 33 Delaware Lawyer 24 at 25. 
78
 KA Burke et al, “The Impact of the Orphan Drug Act on the Development and Advancement 
of Neurological Products for Rare Diseases: A Descriptive Review” (2010) 88 Clinical 
Pharmacology & Therapeutics 449 at 452. 
79Zachary Brennan, “Harvard Professor Questions Success of FDA's Priority Review Voucher 
Program” (30 September, 2015), online: Regulatory Affairs Professionals Society 
http://www.raps.org.  
80
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affects fewer than five in ten thousand patients in the Community or for a “life-threatening, 
seriously debilitating or serious and chronic condition in the Community and that without 
incentives it is unlikely that the marketing of the medicinal product in the Community would 
generate sufficient return to justify the necessary investment”.81 There must also be no authorised 
satisfactory method of diagnosis, prevention or treatment of the condition or, where a product 
already exists, the medicinal product must offer a “significant benefit” to patients affected by the 
rare condition.
82
 
 As in the United States, market exclusivity is available once marketing authorisation is 
obtained.
83
 This provision prevents marketing authorisation from being granted to a similar 
product for the same therapeutic indication for ten years, as opposed to the same product being 
protected for seven years under the ODA.
84
 The Regulations also allow for the ten year period to 
be reduced to six years if the criteria for orphan designation are no longer being met, or under 
circumstances “where it is shown on the basis of available evidence that the product is 
sufficiently profitable” that providing market exclusivity can no longer be justified.85 This 
provision has yet to be exercised and it is unclear how it would be applied (i.e. what would 
trigger a review of the “available evidence” or what threshold would be used to determine 
whether a drug has become “sufficiently profitable”). Sponsors of orphan-designated products 
will also be eligible for Community and Member State funded financial incentives, with 
additional financial assistance available for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
86
 
 Since the introduction of its orphan drug legislation, the European Union has granted 
orphan designation at a steadily increasing rate, suggesting that the incentives offered have 
successfully stimulated R&D of products for rare diseases.
87
 At the same time, only a limited 
number of orphan products have actually received marketing authorisation.
88
 Therefore, as in the 
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United States, in spite of the general success of the orphan drug Regulations, many patients with 
rare diseases still do not have treatments approved for their conditions.  
2.2.3  Other Jurisdictions  
 Australia, Singapore, and Taiwan also have orphan drug policies and, to varying degrees, 
incentives to encourage development and marketing of orphan drugs. These policies are 
significantly less elaborate than the United States and European Union schemes, and therefore 
are generally not considered throughout this thesis. The Australian criteria for orphan drug status 
are somewhat similar to that of the United States and the European Union, in that either disease 
prevalence or the commercial viability of a product will be considered. Orphan designation will 
only be granted for treatments of “life-threatening or seriously debilitating” conditions and that 
are “medically plausible”.89 The condition must be of low prevalence (affecting fewer than five 
in 10, 000 people in Australia) or “not likely to be financially viable for the sponsor to market 
the medicine in Australia” in the absence of the fee waiver incentive.90 Finally, a drug must fill 
an unmet medical need, or be significantly safer or more efficacious than existing treatments in 
order to receive orphan designation.
91
  
 Financial incentives provided by the Australian orphan drug policy are limited to a 
waiver of the fees that would otherwise be required to apply for marketing authorisation, and the 
evaluation and registration as an orphan drug.
92
 At the 2014/15 rates this amounts to $221,400 
(AUD), or roughly $173,600 (USD).
93
 As in other jurisdictions, the introduction of the orphan 
drug policy in Australia has been followed by an increasing number of applications for orphan 
                                                          
89
 Therapeutic Goods Regulations 1990 (Cth), r 16J(3). See also Therapeutic Goods 
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https://www.tga.gov.au/ ([t]he requirement of “medical plausibility” means that generally only 
drugs treating distinct diseases/conditions will be granted “orphan” designation; “subgroups 
would only be considered appropriate where the product would be ineffective in the remaining 
population”).  
90
 Ibid, r 16J(3)(d). 
91
 Ibid, r 16J(f).  
92
 Ibid, r 45(12).  
93
 Austl, Commonwealth, Therapeutic Goods Administration, Orphan Drugs Program 
(Discussion Paper) online: TGA https://www.tga.gov.au/sites/default/files/consultation-orphan-
drugs-program.pdf at 5. By way of comparison, the 2018 FDA application fee for a New Drug 
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drug designation as well as marketing authorisation applications for orphan drugs.
94
 Increased 
submissions for orphan drug designation combined with concerns about the financial impact of 
the program prompted the Therapeutic Goods Administration (Australia’s drug regulatory 
agency) to reconsider the orphan drug program,
95
 and in July of 2017 amendments were made to 
the eligibility criteria in order to more closely align the definition of “orphan disease” with 
international criteria while continuing to promote the availability of treatments for rare 
diseases.
96
  
 Legislation in Singapore defines a rare disease as “a life-threatening and severely 
debilitating illness affecting less than 20,000 patients.”97 Orphan drugs are unapproved products 
that any doctor or dentist has identified as a necessary treatment for a rare disease for which 
there is no other effective alternative treatment available.
98
 No incentives to facilitate research, 
development, and marketing of orphan drugs are provided by the legislation in Singapore. The 
orphan exemption policy is instead intended to enable doctors and dentists to more easily import 
orphan drugs for specific rare diseases.
99
As the Singapore orphan drug policy is not intended to 
promote orphan drug development, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess the effectiveness of 
the policy in this light. With respect to patient access to treatment for rare diseases, it has been 
noted that obtaining orphan designation may be difficult because of lack of clarity with the 
orphan drug definition.
100
 
 In 1993, Japan amended its Pharmaceutical Affairs Law in order to promote the 
development of rare disease treatments.
101
 A rare disease is defined as a disease affecting fewer 
than 50,000 patients in Japan, which is incurable, and for which there is no current treatment 
available or where the drug being applied for orphan status is “excellent in comparison with 
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other available drugs.”102 Additionally, orphan status will only be granted for drugs for which 
there is “a theoretical basis for the application of the product to the targeted disease and a 
feasible development plan for it.”103 Japan is the only jurisdiction considered here which has 
such a “feasibility” requirement for orphan designations.  
 In Japan orphan drugs can be granted a ten year re-examination period, which in practise 
functions as marketing exclusivity.
104
 During the re-examination period, other applicants cannot 
apply for marketing approval for the same drug.
105
 Under the Japanese legislation orphan 
products will automatically be subject to fast track (priority) review.
106
 As in the United States, 
the Japanese government will provide funding to subsidize the costs of testing and research into 
orphan products.
107
 Expenses incurred from orphan drug R&D activities are eligible for a tax 
deduction,
108
 and drug sponsors can receive a 16% tax reduction for marketing approval 
application fees.
109
 
 Taiwan’s orphan drug policy was initially implemented in 1998 and updated in 2010.110 
Orphan designation may be obtained for pharmaceuticals intended for the prevention, diagnosis, 
or treatment of a rare disease.
111
 The Rare Disease Control and Orphan Drug Act defines a rare 
disease as one whose prevalence is “lower than that formulated and publicly announced by the 
central competent authority, and recognised by the orphan drug committee.”112 Market 
exclusivity may be granted for approved orphan drugs for up to ten years, during which time no 
marketing application for the same kind of pharmaceutical product will be accepted.
113
As in the 
United States, market exclusivity can be displaced in favour of a similar pharmaceutical that is 
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superior in terms of safety and efficacy.
114
 Interestingly, the Taiwanese policy also permits 
market exclusivity to be broken if the central competent authority determines that the price of the 
original orphan drug is unreasonable.
115
 The policy also requires central and municipal 
competent authorities to encourage orphan drug development through the provision of funds.
116
 
2.2.4  Orphan Drug Policy in Canada 
 Canada has no specific policy to address the needs of rare disease patients. A Canadian 
orphan drug policy was rejected in 1997 on the basis that Canadian patients with rare diseases 
already have sufficient access to products approved in the United States and other jurisdictions 
via the Special Access Program (“SAP”), which is a program that grants patients access to 
treatments that are not approved in Canada.
117
 It has also been suggested that a Canadian orphan 
drug policy would be unnecessary or otherwise unlikely to have a significant impact because of 
relatively low levels of innovative drug research in Canada, a reliance on the pharmaceutical 
industry in the United States, and a small population.
118
 Tax credits for R&D, strong patent 
protection, and reduced new drug application fees have been also cited as reasons why specific 
orphan drug legislation is unnecessary in Canada.
119
  
 Nonetheless, in the past decade, interest in a Canadian orphan drug policy has been 
renewed and, at least until the middle of October 2017, Health Canada was said to be working 
toward amending the Food and Drug Regulations.
120
  In 2012, a draft proposal for a Canadian 
orphan drug scheme was developed but never implemented.
121
 Under the proposed framework, 
orphan drug status would be granted for drugs “intended for the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation 
or prevention of a life-threatening, seriously debilitating, or serious and chronic disease or 
condition affecting not more than five in 10 thousand persons in Canada” that will “provide a 
potentially substantial benefit for the patient distinguishable from the existing therapy.”122  Note 
that this definition, as with the definitions used by the European Union, Australia, and Singapore, 
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takes into account the severity or seriousness of the disease. This differs from how an orphan 
disease is defined in the United States under the ODA, where only prevalence or commercial 
(un)viability are considered.
123
 Similar to policies of other countries, market exclusivity, for a 
period of up to eight years and six months, would be granted to orphan products that receive 
marketing authorisation from Health Canada.
124
 While this proposal has not yet led to legislative 
changes, over the years, the Canadian Organization for Rare Disorders (“CORD”), a patient 
advocacy group, has persistently lobbied for an orphan drug framework.
125
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CHAPTER 3: JUSTIFYING INCENTIVES FOR ORPHAN DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
 While this thesis seeks to evaluate the impact that incentives for orphan drug 
development could be expected to have in Canada, it must be noted that there is controversy over 
whether it is appropriate for governments to provide incentives for orphan drugs at all. This 
Chapter first describes how market failure theory provides the underlying justification for orphan 
drug policies and then addresses two overarching complaints about orphan drug incentives. The 
first line of argument against orphan drug incentives is that they are not necessary. The 
“unnecessary” argument has been applied to orphan drug policy in Canada specifically as well to 
orphan drug incentives in general. The second argument is that, even if some form of 
government incentives for orphan drug development are still necessary, “rarity” alone is 
insufficient to justify the provision of incentives. The Chapter concludes by summarizing the 
arguments in favour of providing orphan drug incentives in Canada and providing 
recommendations about how orphan drug policy could be introduced so as to address the 
complaints about orphan drug frameworks.  
3.1 Controversy Regarding the Need for Orphan Drug Incentives 
 Government subsidization of private, commercial innovation is widespread and generally 
accepted as justifiable.
126
 It is believed that government-provided financial incentives for 
innovation do in fact “pay off” in the long-run.127 Market failure theory is frequently cited as 
providing a strong economic rationale for governments to provide some form of R&D subsidy, 
either directly via a cash-based transfer or indirectly through the tax system.
128
 The market for 
innovation is considered to be incomplete because “there is abundant empirical evidence that an 
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individual firm cannot capture all the benefit of its investment in R&D.”129 Rather, R&D 
activities can produce “spillovers”, where some knowledge and technological advancements 
resulting from privately funded R&D activities are likely to be picked up and used free-of-charge 
by others, thereby providing a benefit that extends beyond the company that undertook the R&D 
project.
130
 In other words, R&D activity is generally expected to result in benefits that will be 
enjoyed by those other than the party engaging in the R&D.
131
 Therefore, because companies 
cannot expect to fully recoup the costs of doing R&D it is unlikely that they will invest in 
innovation at a satisfactory rate in the absence of subsidization.
132
 It is therefore generally 
expected that one’s government will bear at least some of the costs of private R&D activity. 
 Orphan drug policies were implemented as a response to concerns that, in the absence of 
incentives, the pharmaceutical industry would neglect to develop treatments for diseases that 
were rare or otherwise unlikely to be profitable.  In other words, a market failure was perceived 
to exist with respect to diseases of low prevalence and therefore it was considered good public 
policy for governments to provide incentives that would address this market failure by 
encouraging drug developers to develop and market treatments for diseases that were otherwise 
being neglected.
133
 
 In spite of the market failure perceived with respect to orphan drug development, it has 
been argued that incentives for orphan drug development are not necessary. To begin with, as 
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discussed above, two primary reasons that have been cited as rendering a Canadian orphan drug 
unnecessary are: one, that incentives are unlikely to be successful because of relatively low 
levels of innovative drug research taking place in Canada,
134
 and two, that Canadian patients 
already have sufficient access to treatments coming from the United States, including the ability 
to access unapproved drugs via the SAP.
135
  
 In response to the first reason, a potentially low level of pharmaceutical innovation in 
Canada provides a relatively weak argument against providing any orphan drug incentives. There 
is evidence that Canada does lag behind other countries with respect to the amount of money 
being invested in pharmaceutical R&D, as compared to the amount being spent via 
pharmaceutical sales.
136
 To put this into perspective, R&D spending by PhRMA member 
companies in the United States was 50.7 billion in 2010,
137
 while Canada’s total pharmaceutical 
business R&D spending was 1.18 billion in that year.
138
 In 2011, pharmaceutical industry 
spending on R&D was 0.30% and 0.03% of gross domestic product in the United States and 
Canada, respectively.
139
 Nevertheless, Canada’s pharmaceutical industry is second only to the IT 
industry in terms of innovative levels.
140
 At the very least, it is not obvious that there is 
insufficient potential within Canada’s pharmaceutical industry for orphan drug incentives to have 
an impact and, in any event, incentives that are not “used” will not be very costly (aside from the 
costs of setting up the administration of an orphan drug program – i.e. design costs). We should 
consider the possibility that there is in fact significant (or, at least, sufficient) potential in Canada 
for innovative pharmaceutical activity and that what is actually lacking are incentives to 
innovate. As will be discussed in greater detail below, industry incentives for innovation can 
supplement patent law as a means of addressing market failures. As Canadian patent law has 
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been cited as being especially restrictive and stringent,
141
 it may be particularly important that 
additional encouragement for orphan drug development be provided.  
 Furthermore, the assertion that Canadian patients can adequately obtain access to rare 
disease treatments that are developed in other jurisdictions is certainly open for debate. There is 
evidence indicating that patients with rare diseases in Canada are not receiving appropriate 
treatment at a satisfactory rate. One study has confirmed that there is a “significant disparity” 
between the number of orphan drugs available in Canada and the number of orphan drugs 
available in the United States.
142
 CORD asserts that currently “only 60% of treatments for rare 
disorders make it into Canada and most get approved up to six years later than in the United 
States and Europe,”143 though at least one investigation indicates that roughly 75% of orphan 
drugs approved in the United States are in fact also available on the market in Canada.
144
 
Nevertheless, there does appear to be some delay between when companies apply for market 
approval in the United States or the European Union and when they apply for approval in 
Canada, with smaller companies being more likely than larger companies to delay marketing 
their drug in Canada.
145
 
 In circumstances where an orphan drug has not been approved as a treatment for a 
particular rare disease, very often the only available treatments for rare disease patients in 
Canada will be found in off-label drug use, a practice that is associated with higher risks than 
taking the same drug for its approved indication(s) because the off-label use has not been subject 
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to regulatory review.
146
 In the alternative, rare disease patients who wish to obtain drugs that are 
not approved in Canada can apply to the SAP; however, drugs that are accessed through this 
program are usually not covered by either public or private health care plans, thereby putting 
patients who must use the SAP in order to gain access to appropriate treatments at a disadvantage 
relative to other patients because of the significant financial costs.
 147
  
 It is not uncommon for pharmaceutical companies to refrain from marketing their 
products in Canada and this is not necessarily a cause for concern,
148
 but, for patients with rare 
diseases that have no alternative treatment options, this is a problem. “Access” to approved 
orphan treatments via the SAP comes at a cost that patients with common diseases are not 
generally required to bear. If appropriate treatments were available without the costs and delays 
associated with using the SAP, there could be improved health outcomes as well as a reduction 
in the public healthcare costs of caring for patients in the advanced stages of a disease, some of 
which could be avoided by earlier or more effective treatment.
149
  
 It is also argued that orphan drug policies in general have outlived their usefulness and 
are no longer necessary in light of scientific advances and changes in the pharmaceutical industry 
that have made the orphan drug market more attractive to drug developers. In other words, some 
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authors contend that a market failure no longer exists with respect to rare diseases.
150
  Within the 
pharmaceutical industry, developing and marketing rare disease drugs has become a fairly 
attractive investment, thereby reducing the likelihood that such diseases will be “orphaned” by 
the pharmaceutical industry as they historically have been.
151
 The orphan drug market is now 
actually seen by some pharmaceutical companies as profitable niche to invest in,
152
 and the 
additional risk and costs associated with orphan drug development may no longer exist in light of 
factors that increase the potential profitability of orphan drugs and lower development costs.
153
 
That being said, interest in orphan drug development could simply be a reflection that the 
industry is using orphan drug incentives as they were always intended: to enable companies to 
profit from developing and marketing orphan drugs.
154
 Increasing the profitability of orphan 
drugs, and therefore removing the disincentive to invest in orphan drugs, was the point of the 
ODA.
155
 This argument has been countered by pointing out that increasing use of disease 
stratification coupled with the disproportionate development of cancer-treating orphan drugs 
does not allow for such a simple explanation,
156
 thereby calling into question the original 
justifications for orphan drug policies.
157
 Nevertheless, this issue is not settled and the 
pharmaceutical industry contends that the incentives for orphan drugs are still necessary to 
ensure continued investment in what is still a financially risky endeavour.
158
 In further support of 
the ongoing utility of orphan drug incentives are observations that orphan drug schemes can 
incite a domino effect whereby further interest and development in the orphan drug field appears 
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to be stimulated when other jurisdictions implement orphan drug policies.
159
 For example, since 
the European Union introduced its own orphan drug legislation, the number of orphan drug 
designations in the United States has sharply increased (by roughly 475%).
160
  
3.2 Questions about the Allocation and Impact of Incentives 
 Another set of questions surrounds the ways in which incentives allocate resources to 
particular types of rare diseases or to rare diseases as a group as compared to other diseases or 
conditions. As discussed above, orphan drug policies are generally regarded as having been 
successful at encouraging the development of rare disease treatments.
161
 The original 
justification for providing incentives probably were correct, and many authors do agree that 
some rare disease treatments currently available would not exist had it not been for the 
incentives.
162
 However, it is undeniable that obtaining market exclusivity and other orphan drug 
incentives is not currently dependent on developers demonstrating that they incurred any 
additional risk or cost associated with developing an orphan drug. Orphan drug policies in both 
the United States and European Union allow it to be assumed that drugs intended to treat a 
disease suffered by fewer than 200,000 patients (in the United States)
163
 or not more than five in 
ten thousand persons (in the European Union) will not be commercially viable.
164
 It was 
originally intended that orphan status would only be granted for diseases for which there was “no 
reasonable expectation” that the R&D costs for a treating drug could be recovered from sales of 
the drug in the United States.
165
 Drug developers would therefore have been required to provide 
information about their anticipated costs of bringing a drug to market. The regulations were 
amended to include a prevalence-based definition of rare disease, which allows financial risk to 
be assumed for diseases that are suffered by less than 200,000 people.
166
 In at least some cases 
this assumption is likely to be false.
167
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 In spite of the success of the ODA in creating “an environment in which orphan drug 
development is realistic and attainable”, 95% of orphan diseases still do not have any approved 
treatments.
168
 One possibility is that orphan drug incentives do not work at all, but it is more 
likely that the incentives do not direct investment in a manner that is sufficiently equitable or 
effective. Several authors have expressed the concern that orphan drug incentives such as market 
exclusivity “promote the concentration of marketing activities in a few profitable therapeutic 
areas at the expense of others that are equally, if not more, important.”169 As will be discussed in 
greater detail below, there is evidence that factors including disease type and the amount of 
publically available knowledge about a disease can determine whether companies choose to 
develop a treatment for a given disease.
170
 The type of rare disease that a patient suffers from 
does in fact seem to be a significant factor in determining the likelihood that a treatment will be 
developed and approved.
171
 Cancer-treating drugs in particular dominate the orphan drug market, 
likely because drug companies can expect to make greater profits from cancer treatments 
(especially when one considers that off-label use of drug products is particularly common in 
oncology) than from other orphan drugs.
172
 It is therefore reasonable to argue that incentives for 
orphan drug development are still justified, but what does need to be amended is how “orphan 
drug” is defined. In other words, the eligibility criterion that governs the allocation of orphan 
drug incentives should be refined to ensure that incentives direct the pharmaceutical industry 
toward diseases that are in fact at risk of being orphaned. 
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From a broader perspective, it has been suggested that “funding policies that take 
resources from elsewhere in health economy budgets to fund these [rare disease] treatments are 
not in the public interest”173 because they may result in research into more common diseases 
being neglected in favour of pursuing the incentives offered for rare diseases.  Orphan drug 
incentives may have the undesirable effect of directing industry focus and resources away from 
other, equally deserving areas.
174
  It is not obvious that diseases should be given priority based 
solely on prevalence, and one could legitimately question whether public resources should focus 
on diseases that are rare and therefore less likely to create a significant burden on society,
175
 
particularly when one considers the competing claims to a government’s finite resources. 
“Rarity” in and of itself may not justify the allocation of government resources,176 and how 
Canadian policymakers can address this issue will be discussed in greater detail at the conclusion 
of this Chapter.  
With respect to rare diseases, allocating a disproportionate amount of resources in order 
to promote the development of appropriate treatments can be justified on the basis of morality 
and a commitment to equality. Embedded within the arguments against orphan drug incentives in 
Canada is an assumption of judicious government spending; incentives should not be pursued 
where they reap insufficient positive results. Nevertheless, public health policies are not always 
determined solely by strict considerations about cost and impact, and a moral imperative to 
respond to people in need may justify incentives even where the cost of doing so is 
disproportionate to the result.  The rule of rescue, whereby “standard” cost-effectiveness 
considerations may give way to a moral imperative to “rescue” identifiable individuals (or a 
group of individuals so small that its members are in effect “identifiable”), is one basis for saying 
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there is a moral obligation to allocate resources to encourage orphan drug development.
177
 The 
rule of rescue can be engaged under circumstances that threaten the lives, or well-being, of 
identifiable individuals and there is an opportunity to avoid or neutralize that threat.
178
 When the 
rule of rescue is in operation, an otherwise disproportionate allocation of resources is considered 
not only justifiable but morally required.
179
  The moral imperative for directing resources toward 
orphan drug development may be strengthened by the fact that many orphan diseases are serious 
in nature,
180
 and frequently suffered by children.
181
 Arguments for a Canadian orphan disease 
framework frequently employ such reasoning,
182
 suggesting that the moral imperative to rescue 
is one basis for justifying orphan drug incentives. 
 Furthermore, it is actually relatively common to have a rare disease and therefore the 
economic impact of rare diseases all together is likely not insignificant. While, by definition, the 
number of patients that suffer from a single rare disease is very small, roughly 6,000 to 8,000 
rare diseases have been identified worldwide,
183
 and therefore the total number of patients 
suffering from a rare disease is substantial. It is estimated that over 30 million Europeans, or 
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roughly 6 to 8% of the EU population are living with an identified rare disease
184
 and similar 
statistics have been suggested for the United States, where approximately 1 in 10 people are 
affected by a rare disease.
185
  CORD estimates that 1 in 12 Canadians, roughly 3 million, suffer 
from a rare disease.
186
 Therefore, it is incorrect to state that rare diseases do not generate a large 
impact on society, particularly when one also takes into account the family of a patient with a 
rare disease (and, given that many rare diseases affect children, it is likely that many parents 
have to withdraw from the workforce to act as caregivers).  
 Concerns about equality also favour the implementation of a Canadian orphan drug 
policy and support the argument that governments may have an obligation to encourage 
pharmaceutical innovation if no treatments are available in the absence of incentives.
187
 
Proponents of orphan drug incentives argue that patients with rare diseases should not suffer 
from a lack of treatment on account of the fact that their disease is rare.
188
 CORD suggests that 
the challenges faced by patients and their families, such as misdiagnosis, unnecessary surgeries, 
social isolation, financial hardship, lack of treatment options and early death, affect those with 
rare diseases to a greater degree.
189
 Patients with rare diseases may also face additional 
challenges specifically because they have a rare disease as opposed to a more common one; for 
example, very often the doctor who first examines a patient with a rare disease has never seen 
that disease before, thereby making timely diagnoses difficult,
190
 which can lead to negative 
clinical outcomes and untimely death.
191
 The additional risks (such as delayed diagnosis) and 
costs (of drugs accessed through the SAP that are not typically covered by health care plans) that 
individual rare disease patients often incur because their disease is rare strengthen the argument 
that, for the sake of equality, incentives for orphan drugs are warranted. Therefore, providing 
orphan drug incentives is, at least in principle (aside from potential implementation and design 
costs), good public policy.  
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  In addition to morality and equality-based arguments in favour of orphan drug 
incentives, there has been some suggestion that governments have a legal obligation to fund rare 
disease treatments;
 192
 this argument could reasonably be expanded to suggest that governments, 
at the very least, are obligated to provide incentives that are designed to promote development 
and marketing of rare disease treatments. Potential routes for establishing a legal obligation have 
been identified in disability legislation, national and health systems constitutions, judicial review, 
tort law, and human rights legislation.
193
 In 2010 Canada ratified the 2007 United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
194
 The definition of “persons with 
disabilities” is not fixed and arguably can include patients with rare diseases.195 Ratifying the 
Convention may impose an obligation on Canadian policymakers with respect to certain rare 
disease patients; relevant provisions include the obligation to: 
adopt legislation and administrative measures to promote the human rights of 
persons with disabilities; protect and promote the rights of persons with 
disabilities in all policies and programmes; undertake research and development 
of accessible goods, services and technology for persons with disabilities and 
encourage others to undertake such research; and to consult with and involve 
persons with disabilities in developing and implementing legislation and policies 
and in decision-making processes that concern them.
196
  
Failing to introduce incentives for orphan drug development, or to at least meaningfully re-
consider enacting an orphan drug policy, could reasonably be considered a failure to implement 
Canada’s commitments under this Convention.  
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The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, to which Canada 
is a signatory, provides another possible basis for finding that Canada has a legal obligation to 
provide incentives for orphan drug development.
197
 Article 12 affirms the “right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” and Article 15 
confirms the right of everyone “to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications”.198 If the pharmaceutical industry neglects certain types of diseases because they 
are not sufficiently profitable, then patients who suffer from those neglected diseases are unable 
to enjoy “the highest attainable standard” of health and are being denied “the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications.” It is known that companies significantly delay bringing 
their orphan drugs to the Canadian market.
199
 Providing incentives to encourage sponsors to 
apply for market authorisation in a timely manner could serve as one way for Canada to honour 
its international commitments.  
 As the ODA appears to have been successful at encouraging the pharmaceutical industry 
to invest in orphan drugs (with limitations on that success, as noted above), at the very least 
Canada should introduce incentives that are aimed at encouraging companies to market these 
drugs in Canada (i.e. to apply for regulatory approval). This will serve to reduce the financial 
burden of patients with rare diseases whose only option is to access treatments via the SAP. As 
there continues to be many rare diseases for which no treatments have been developed, 
encouraging innovative drug development to address these unmet medical needs remains a 
suitable secondary goal of a Canadian orphan drug policy. The following Chapters proceed on 
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the basis that orphan drug incentives are justifiable in principle and, from that basis, assess the 
potential for three different incentives to promote the policy objectives of both increasing access 
to approved treatments and facilitating the development of new treatments for orphan diseases.  
At this point it should be noted that it is unclear how exactly orphan drug incentives 
should be allocated, as there is certainly room to question whether it is appropriate to allocate 
government resources based solely on disease prevalence (or lack thereof).
200
 Existing orphan 
drug policies are relatively blunt instruments. The ODA definition of “orphan disease” does not 
specify disease features beyond prevalence, though the EU policy does require that the disease 
also be life-threatening or chronically debilitating in order to be granted orphan status.
201
 
Arguably, disease severity should be a consideration. As discussed above, incentives for orphan 
drug development were introduced to address concerns that rare diseases were being neglected 
by the pharmaceutical industry because they are not seen as profitable.
202
 In 1983, when the 
ODA was introduced, being “rare” in and of itself likely warranted the provision of incentives 
because rare diseases, in general, were being neglected. With rare diseases now representing a 
potentially profitable business opportunity,
203
 in order to avoid overburdening public resources, 
being “rare” may no longer be sufficient to justify incentives. Furthermore, in light of scientific 
advances that allow relatively prevalent diseases to be divided into distinct groups, some of 
which may then be classified as “rare”, identifying diseases that are legitimate targets for 
incentives on the basis of prevalence is no longer such a straightforward matter.
204
 It might be 
more appropriate to grant orphan disease status only to rare diseases that are also life-threatening 
or chronically debilitating. Alternatively, it has been suggested that the definition of “orphan 
disease” should direct companies toward diseases that are truly in danger of being neglected, for 
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whatever reason, regardless of prevalence or severity.
205
 With no orphan drug policy at the 
moment, Canada is well-positioned to confront these questions. Starting from the ground up 
affords policy makers the opportunity to give careful consideration to the definition of “orphan”.  
 Furthermore, in order to address the concerns that orphan drug policies have become 
unnecessary it has been suggested that incentives need to be more closely tied to public health 
outcomes,
206
 though it is unclear how exactly this could be achieved. One solution is to impose 
stricter criteria for what qualifies to receive incentives, such as by refining the definition of 
“orphan drug” to better align with the spirit of the regulations, which is to prevent diseases from 
being neglected by the pharmaceutical industry.
207
 In the United States, unlike in the European 
Union and Australia, applicants do not need to show that there is a lack of alternative treatments, 
or that their drug offers a significant benefit over existing treatments, in order to access orphan 
drug incentives.
208
 Including this requirement would have the benefit of tying incentives to a 
demonstration of an actual problem and is one opportunity to avoid granting an incentive where 
it would be unnecessary to do so, and instead direct incentives to where there is the greatest need 
for them.   
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CHAPTER 4: INCENTIVE OPTION 1 – MARKET EXCLUSIVITY 
4.1  Introduction 
 Market exclusivity is provided by orphan drug policies in both the United States and the 
European Union to pharmaceutical companies that successfully apply for marketing 
authorisation for a designated orphan drug.
209
 The incentive is available in addition to patent 
protection, and may offer a number of advantages over patent law in terms of being an effective 
incentive, as will be discussed in greater detail below.  Widely considered to be the primary 
incentive available to orphan drug developers,
210
 market exclusivity for an orphan drug operates 
only in relation to the specific orphan disease for which the drug is an approved treatment.
211
 To 
elaborate, when exclusivity is in effect the regulatory agency (e.g. in the United States, the FDA) 
will not approve a subsequent marketing authorisation application for the same drug to treat that 
orphan disease for a specified period of time.
212
 In the United States, market exclusivity 
protection lasts for seven years.
213
 Under the European Union Regulations exclusivity is 
maintained for 10 years, though the protection period may be shortened to six years if it is shown 
that the drug is “sufficiently profitable” to make market protection no longer necessary.214 
Multiple periods of exclusivity can be obtained for single orphan drug, one for each indication 
for which the drug is approved as a treatment.
215
  As will be discussed in greater detail below, 
there is controversy over the practice of obtaining multiple periods of protection for a single 
drug.
216
 
 As a “pull”, (or “revenue-side”) incentive, market exclusivity functions by maximizing 
the ability of a developer to profit from marketing an orphan drug for a pre-determined period of 
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time, and thereby addresses a presumed disincentive to developing orphan drugs. The 2012 draft 
discussion document for a proposed Canadian orphan drug framework did include market 
exclusivity as an incentive,
217
 and it is reasonable to assume that any future Canadian orphan 
drug policy could also use market exclusivity to encourage the development and marketing of 
orphan drugs. Therefore, an evaluation of the issues with market exclusivity and how it could be 
expected to function in Canada is warranted.  
 This Chapter is informed by the market exclusivity provisions as they have been 
implemented in the United States and by the European Union and the evaluation of their 
effectiveness.
218
 The following discussion leads to the conclusion that market exclusivity is an 
effective incentive for orphan drug development and should be implemented in Canada, albeit 
with some modifications to the United States and European Union models.  This Chapter is 
organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes how market exclusivity functions as an incentive for 
pharmaceutical innovation relative to patent law. Market exclusivity addresses some public 
policy concerns about patent law and has features that likely make it an attractive and useful 
incentive for pharmaceutical companies. In Section 4.3, the overall impact market exclusivity 
has had on public health outcomes is analyzed. This discussion leads to the conclusion that the 
effectiveness of market exclusivity is somewhat tempered by the ongoing problems relating to 
affordable access to approved treatments. It follows from this conclusion that, while market 
exclusivity should be introduced as a Canadian orphan drug incentive, exclusivity periods should 
be terminated for drugs that have become “sufficiently profitable” and that the profits made for a 
drug as a treatment for related orphan disease subsets should be added up when the profitability 
of a drug is being assessed. These provisions will hopefully dissuade companies from setting 
excessively high prices and, at the very least, will help to quell concerns about pharmaceutical 
companies exploiting orphan drug policies for profit. Section 4.4 concludes with a summary of 
the conclusions and findings arrived at in this Chapter and the suggestions described therein.  
 This thesis primarily considers the relatively broader issues and aspects of market 
exclusivity: in particular, its effectiveness, the overall impact market exclusivity has had on the 
availability of and access to treatment, and the main public policy issues surrounding use of the 
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incentive. Other important concerns regarding market exclusivity exist, such as the interpretation 
that regulatory authorities give to “same drug” or disease in determining whether or not 
exclusivity protection applies,
219
 but these concerns are beyond the scope of this thesis and will 
therefore not be discussed in detail.  
4.2 The Role of Exclusivity in Innovation Policy 
 Market exclusivity gives drug developers protection from potential competitors in a 
manner that is similar to the protection available via a patent, but may also offer a number of 
advantages in terms of addressing public policy concerns regarding patent law, specifically with 
respect to the scope of protection. This section describes these advantages. Additionally, the 
criteria for obtaining a patent and market exclusivity, as well as the length and strength of the 
protection conferred by each, are considered from the perspective of drug developers. The theory 
underlying patent protection is that it is necessary to provide some sort of incentive for 
innovation, and patents are considered to be particularly necessary with respect to ensuring that 
pharmaceutical innovation occurs at a satisfactory rate.
220
 As the two incentives function in a 
relatively similar manner it is appropriate to compare how they both operate with respect to 
encouraging investment in orphan drugs. The following discussion leads to the conclusion that 
market exclusivity likely acts as a more powerful motivator for pharmaceutical companies than 
patent law, while involving a lesser sacrifice on the part of the public. 
4.2.1 Market Exclusivity May Satisfy Some Public Policy Concerns about Patent Law 
 As the public temporarily gives up certain rights in exchange for valuable innovation, 
both patent protection and market exclusivity can be seen as forming a sort of a “give-and-take” 
relationship between the inventor/drug developer and all other members of the public. Market 
exclusivity functions similar to a patent in that it reduces competition for a certain length of time 
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during which pharmaceutical companies are expected to be able to profit from their investment 
in developing and marketing an orphan drug.
221
 Where market exclusivity or a patent is in effect, 
potential competitors are prevented from marketing the protected product and the general public 
is denied the ability to purchase the product from another company that makes it available at a 
lower cost. However, the protection (i.e. the rights given up by the public) provided via market 
exclusivity is arguably narrower in scope than a patent.
222
 Patentees are granted very broad rights 
over their patented invention and can exclude all others from making, using, and selling the 
invention.
223
 As such, granting patent protection requires a significant degree of “give” on the 
part of society for the duration of the patent term. 
The total exclusivity over an invention that inventors are granted is a common criticism 
of patent law, with some considering the scope of protection to be overly-generous.
224
  Market 
exclusivity, on the other hand, is far narrower in scope.
225
 Under the European Union 
Regulations, when exclusivity is in effect no “similar medicinal products” will be approved as 
treatments for the same orphan disease,
226
 and in the United States, market exclusivity prevents 
market authorisation being granted for a subsequent drug that is the “same” as the first drug to 
treat the same orphan disease.
227
 Therefore, the protection that a drug developer gets via market 
exclusivity is limited to the specific orphan indication for which market approval was granted; 
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other drug developers are free to get market approval for the protected drug for a different 
disease (barring any applicable patent protection), or to market a different drug as a treatment for 
that orphan disease. The narrower scope of market exclusivity means that society is not “giving 
up” as much as it does when patent protection is in effect.  
Furthermore, both the ODA and the European Regulations allow for exclusivity to be 
“broken” in favour of a subsequent application that is for the same drug to treat the same 
indication if the second drug is essentially the same (or, in the EU, similar) but otherwise 
“clinically superior” to the protected drug.228 “Clinical superiority” may be established with 
respect to either greater effectiveness or greater safety.
229
 The ability to “break” exclusivity 
protection is significant because it is intended to “ensure that orphan drug exclusivity approval 
does not preclude significant improvements in treating rare diseases.”230 This provision ties the 
ongoing application of exclusivity to concerns about the well-being of patients, in a way that 
patent protection does not. From a public policy perspective this aspect of how market 
exclusivity operates represents a potentially meaningful advantage over patent law.   
 Market exclusivity can address a related policy concern about patent law regarding public 
access to protected products. Obtaining patent protection does require that inventors “disclose” 
their inventions;
231
 it does not, however, require that they develop, use, sell or otherwise make 
their invention available for public consumption so that the public may benefit from it. This has 
been a criticism of patent protection, which in theory represents a quid pro quo arrangement 
between the inventor and society, but in reality seems to initially require relatively little from an 
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inventor.
232
 Market exclusivity, on the other hand, can be terminated if a drug company cannot or 
will not make its protected drug available in a sufficient quantity “to meet the needs of persons 
with the disease or condition for which the drug was designated”.233 The wording and inclusion 
of this provision serves to explicitly tie the application of exclusivity protection to ensuring that 
public health needs are being met, at least to some extent.  This aspect of market exclusivity 
requires the commercialisation of orphan drugs, and therefore supports the underlying goal of 
orphan drug incentives of getting appropriate treatments to patients with rare diseases (because 
the incentive is not available until the drug is actually brought to market and may be rescinded if 
a drug developer does not make the drug sufficiently available). From the point of view of 
society, the ability to terminate market exclusivity may represent an improvement over patent 
protection, which is not necessarily dependent on an inventor making the patented subject matter 
available for public use. That being said, Canada’s Patent Act does allow for compulsory 
licensing of patent-protected items under circumstances where exclusivity rights associated with 
a patent are being abused, including where demand for a patented article is not being adequately 
met.
234
 Furthermore, making a product available on the market does not equate to providing 
affordable access and neither regime really addresses affordability issues. Concerns about the 
prices of orphan drugs are discussed in greater detail below, in Section 4.3.2.   
4.2.2  Market Exclusivity Could Provide a More Effective Incentive than Patent Law 
 As described in the above section market exclusivity can address some of the public 
policy concerns surrounding patent law. At the same time, the incentive can also provide 
additional advantages for drug developers. From the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry, 
the ability of patent protection to generate innovation is probably limited because of the strict 
requirements of patent law and the associated uncertainty.
235
 Marketing exclusivity operates in a 
manner that may make it a more effective incentive for orphan drug development.
236
 
Specifically, obtaining exclusivity can be easier in some respects than satisfying the strict 
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requirements of patent law, exclusivity regimes offer greater predictability than the patent 
application process, exclusivity protection may last longer than the effective patent life of a drug 
product, and marketing exclusivity provides an arguably stronger degree of protection than a 
patent because it is enforced by the drug regulatory agency. Each of these features are discussed 
in the following paragraphs and lead to the conclusion that market exclusivity is probably more 
likely to have an impact with respect to orphan drugs than patent law.  
 To begin with, it may be considered easier to obtain market exclusivity than it is to secure 
a patent because of the strict requirements of patent law. Both novelty and inventiveness are 
requirements of patent law
237
 and therefore, patent regimes may insufficiently protect 
investments in pharmaceutical development.
238
 Some valuable drug developments will involve 
finding how an existing drug can be used to treat an orphan disease; patent protection does not 
encourage such developments and may therefore be insufficient to protect the investments made 
to get marketing approval for an orphan disease. Many important medical advances and 
developments do not necessarily result in a patentable product because they are not sufficiently 
novel.
239
 The goal of orphan drug policies is to increase access to safe and effective treatments 
for diseases would otherwise be neglected; whether or not such treatments are “novel” is 
immaterial from the perspective of patients. Market exclusivity may be a more effective 
incentive for orphan drug development than patent protection because it will be available 
regardless of whether or not a drug will be expected to satisfy the “novelty” requirement.  
 Similarly, aside from the risks inherent in the drug development process,
240
 market 
exclusivity provisions can offer pharmaceutical companies greater predictability than patent 
regimes. To qualify for market exclusivity, one must “only” demonstrate that a drug is a safe and 
effective treatment for a designated orphan disease, the same standard that must be met for 
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market authorisation.
241
 A company will know in advance whether their drug has orphan 
designation and can therefore rely on receiving exclusivity protection upon demonstrating the 
safety and efficacy of its product. Pharmaceutical companies looking to secure the investments 
needed to complete the development process can more confidently predict whether or not they 
will be granted exclusivity protection.  Applying for a patent is less predictable because it 
involves interpretation of the legislation and is a far more subjective process.
242
 Inventors 
seeking a patent risk being denied protection after they have already invested in R&D because 
they may be unable to demonstrate that their invention satisfies the applicable criteria (i.e. 
novelty and inventiveness). As such, patent law suffers from indeterminacy that may impair the 
effectiveness of patents as an incentive.
243
 The predictability associated with market exclusivity 
permits pharmaceutical companies to plan their R&D strategy at less risk to their investment and 
with greater confidence that they will receive market exclusivity (provided the drug does receive 
market authorisation), making market exclusivity a more effective incentive.  
 Market exclusivity also arguably lasts longer than patent protection, at least during the 
period when a company can profit from its efforts, because it does not become effective until 
market authorisation is granted (i.e. from the moment a drug may be sold).
244
 Patent protection, 
on the other hand, must typically be secured well before the drug development process can be 
completed and may, therefore, have expired or be close to its expiration by the time the drug is 
approved for the market.
245
 Even if there is the opportunity for companies to have their patent 
extended, this is neither guaranteed nor free of charge.
246
 Market exclusivity, unlike a patent 
extension, is granted automatically and without the additional legal fees of a patent 
application.
247
 Therefore, in addition to being easier and more certain to obtain, market 
exclusivity can provide drug developers with protection from competition longer than a patent. 
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As such, market exclusivity protection may be of greater value to pharmaceutical companies and 
therefore more likely to encourage orphan drug development than patent law.  
 Finally, market exclusivity can be seen as offering a stronger, albeit narrower, degree of 
protection than patent law. Patent infringement is relatively common, and enforcing a patent is a 
time-consuming, expensive, and uncertain process.
248
 Enforcing market exclusivity, on the other 
hand, is taken care of by the regulators of medicinal products. In the United States, for example, 
the FDA protects a product’s exclusivity by not granting market approval for the same drug to 
treat the same orphan disease.
249
 Pharmaceutical companies can therefore rely more confidently 
on exclusivity protection because sales of unauthorized medical treatments are rare, and will be 
quickly dealt with by the FDA in the unlikely event that a competitor does attempt to market an 
unauthorized drug.
250
  Patent holders may also have to contend with challenges to their patent 
and the ensuing legal costs associated with defending their patent, and always face the possibility 
that their patent protection may be narrowed or found to be altogether invalid.
251
 Market 
exclusivity more or less safeguards companies from this uncertainty,
252
  apart from disputes with 
the FDA over whether another product is the “same” as the protected product or is clinically 
superior.  
 In summary, market exclusivity addresses some of the major public policy concerns 
about patent protection. Additionally, exclusivity functions in a manner that likely makes it a 
more attractive and useful incentive for pharmaceutical companies. It is suggested that patents, 
compared with market exclusivity, actually “play a very limited role in fostering innovation” 
because of such relative weakness and uncertainty.
253
 Therefore, at least in theory, market 
exclusivity offers a number of advantages over patent protection. With respect to promoting 
orphan drug development market exclusivity appears to provide an effective supplement to 
patent law.  
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4.3  Effect and Impact of Market Exclusivity 
 Orphan drug policies in general are considered to have been successful at encouraging 
pharmaceutical companies to invest in and develop treatments for rare diseases, with market 
exclusivity being the most important or “cornerstone” incentive in these policies, and many 
authors also consider that market exclusivity has, in fact, been effective at promoting the 
development of orphan drugs.
254
 Nevertheless, there is some debate over the extent to which 
market exclusivity has been a factor in the increased development of orphan drugs. There 
certainly are other factors that have promoted interest in orphan drugs development (such as 
scientific advances and over-crowding of the “blockbuster drug” markets).255 It has been 
suggested that simply looking at whether orphan drug development has increased since the 
introduction of the incentive is too simplistic and therefore market exclusivity regimes should 
require  independent expert review in order to get a better understanding of the incentive’s 
effectiveness.
256
 At the same time, it is difficult to ignore the dramatic improvement in orphan 
drug availability since the introduction of orphan drug incentives. While it is not possible to 
identify the exact degree of effectiveness of any single incentive, and other factors have certainly 
played a part in promoting orphan drug development, it can reasonably be concluded that market 
exclusivity has had some positive impact on the number of orphan drugs being developed and 
brought to market.  
 That being said, it remains to be considered how well market exclusivity functions in 
terms of addressing the underlying goals of the incentive. Critics argue that orphan drug policies 
do not promote the development and marketing of drugs for neglected diseases to a satisfactory 
degree.
257
 Two problems in particular have been identified in the literature: availability of 
approved treatments and access to approved treatments. Many identified orphan diseases still do 
not have any drugs approved for use, and, therefore, patients with those diseases do not have 
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appropriate treatment options available to them.
258
 This first problem can largely be attributed to 
the definition of “orphan drug” that is used to determine the allocation of incentives. As 
discussed above, changes should be made to the eligibility criteria for “orphan drug” designation 
in order to direct investment in R&D toward diseases that are still without any available 
treatments. The second problem is that even where approved treatments exist, high prices for 
many orphan drugs can act as an insurmountable barrier to actually accessing these products.
259
 
Market exclusivity has been specifically cited in relation to both of these issues, with one vocal 
critic of orphan drug policies having observed that “unless a rare disease patient has a rare form 
of cancer and/or belongs to a high socioeconomic class, the US approach to orphan drugs seems 
unlikely to improve the patient’s lot.”260  At best, it has been suggested that market exclusivity 
does not sufficiently direct pharmaceutical investments to rare diseases in an equitable manner 
with the result that many diseases are ignored in favour of the rare diseases that show the greatest 
potential to be profitable.
261
 At worst, allegations have been made that market exclusivity 
actually impedes access to the very drugs it was meant to incentivize because pharmaceutical 
companies can charge very high prices without facing competition from another company 
marketing the same product.
262
 The following section considers these issues, and arrives at the 
conclusion that while modifying market exclusivity schemes is not sufficient to address 
availability concerns, longer periods of exclusivity combined with the ability to terminate the 
protection in circumstances where it is no longer warranted could make some headway toward 
promoting affordable access to orphan drugs. 
4.3.1  Impact of Market Exclusivity on Orphan Drug Development 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, for many patients a lack of available approved treatment is 
still very much an issue. Notwithstanding the observed successes of orphan drug policies, many 
rare diseases are still without any approved treatments
263
 and, therefore, many patients with rare 
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diseases still do not have approved treatments available to them.
264
 Market exclusivity has been 
criticized on the basis that it does not sufficiently dictate the direction that pharmaceutical 
companies must take with respect to orphan drug development or, in other words, that 
exclusivity still permits market forces to direct R&D investment.
265
 Recall that orphan drug 
incentives were introduced in order to address market failures for rare diseases. Obviously a 
number of factors will influence pharmaceutical investment, but there is evidence that disease 
prevalence
266
 and the amount of publically available research about a disease do predict 
investment as between rare diseases.
267
 Rare diseases that show the most potential for profit 
(such as rare cancers and cancer-related diseases) are the ones for which drugs are developed. 
Further, pharmaceutical companies are more likely to develop treatments for more prevalent rare 
diseases, in part because there is more publically available knowledge about these diseases due 
to their relative prevalence.
268
 Unsurprisingly, research about a given disease will foster and 
promote the development of treatments for that disease.
269
 As such, market exclusivity is not as 
precise or as targeted as would be desirable if the justification for providing incentives is that 
everyone deserves medical treatment regardless of how prevalent (or not) their disease is. On the 
other hand, it is unlikely that exclusivity periods actually contribute to diseases being neglected. 
Rather, market exclusivity merely does not sufficiently address the market forces that favour 
drug development for certain diseases. It is notable that this is only a failure if, as discussed 
above in Chapter 3, one concludes that there should be equitable access to treatment regardless 
of prevalence. 
 The concerns regarding diseases that remain orphaned by the pharmaceutical industry 
have been discussed at length in Chapter 3 and, without attempting to conclusively state how 
orphan drug incentives should be allocated, disease prevalence arguably should not be the sole 
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factor in designating “orphan” status. Concerns about which diseases drug companies choose to 
invest in, and the lack of availability of approved treatments for those with other diseases, does 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that market exclusivity should not be implemented.  
Rather, the terms dictating the availability of market exclusivity should be carefully crafted to 
target drug development where most desirable from a policy perspective. This involves 
answering broad policy questions regarding what should qualify as justifying incentives and for 
what diseases incentives are warranted. In large part, this has been discussed in Chapter 3, where 
it was concluded that orphan drug incentives should strive to promote investment in diseases that 
are serious and/or likely to be neglected.   
 Furthermore, which diseases attract pharmaceutical investment may actually be of lesser 
concern in the Canadian context. Recall that it was originally determined that the potential for 
pharmaceutical innovation in Canada is too low to justify having an orphan drug policy.
270
 If the 
development of new drugs for ultra rare or otherwise less profitable diseases is unlikely to 
happen in Canada regardless of any incentives being offered, then the issue of availability is less 
of a concern for Canadian policymakers. Market exclusivity in Canada could still encourage 
foreign drug developers of orphan drugs to apply for regulatory approval in Canada, which 
would be of benefit to Canadian patients because there does appear to be a time lag between 
approval in the United States or European Union and in Canada.
271
 Ideally, from the perspective 
of patients with no available treatment, jurisdictions with greater innovative potential will 
address this shortcoming of orphan drug policies and see fit to direct R&D investments by some 
other means. As market exclusivity appears to be an effective incentive, it should be included in 
a Canadian orphan drug policy. The definition of “orphan” will determine eligibility for 
exclusivity and careful wording therefore should assist in directing pharmaceutical investments 
in a manner that will best address the availability problem. 
4.3.2  Impact of Market Exclusivity on Access to Orphan Drugs 
 While the implementation of the ODA has been followed by dramatic increases in the 
development of rare disease treatments, it is not uncommon for patients with rare diseases to 
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have trouble accessing these treatments because of their extremely high prices.
272
  The biggest 
complaint about orphan drug policies is that they promote high drug prices,
273
 and in general 
orphan drugs are expensive relative to treatments for common disorders.
274
 Evidence shows that 
access to treatment for rare diseases is in fact hindered in both Canada and the United States by 
the substantial co-payments that are required for orphan drugs.
275
 Market exclusivity in particular 
is frequently associated in the literature with high prices for orphan drugs.
276
 This is problematic 
as the ultimate goal of orphan drug policies is to address the unmet medical needs of patients 
with rare diseases, a goal that cannot be accomplished if patients are unable to afford the drugs 
they need. There is therefore a strong imperative to “balance incentives for investment in 
research and development with assurance that the products will be available at a reasonable cost 
to patients.”277 This section explores the connection between market exclusivity and the high 
prices that are typical of orphan drugs.  
 It is alleged that market exclusivity encourages excessively high prices because the 
incentive in effect creates a monopoly within which a company may charge whatever it likes 
during the period of protection,
278 
but it is uncertain whether or not market exclusivity actually 
operates in this manner. To begin with, even where exclusivity protection applies, other drug 
developers are free to market a different drug. “Non-similar” (in the European Union) or “non-
same” (in the United States) treatments are not excluded by the market exclusivity regulations, 
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and even similar/same treatments can be approved for sale if they are clinically superior.
279
 At 
least one study indicates that orphan drugs protected by market exclusivity do not dissuade 
alternative treatments from being developed and marketed.
280
 As discussed above,
281
 a number of 
factors increase the likelihood of additional drugs entering the market for a specific orphan 
disease, with the greatest predicator being the amount of scientific output for that disease 
(whereby more scientific publications about a disease increases the chances that another orphan 
drug will be developed as a treatment for that disease).
282
 In addition, certain types of rare 
diseases are the subject of more R&D investment regardless of whether there are exclusivity-
protected drugs already on the market, with rare oncological disorders having a greater chance of 
having subsequent orphan drug products developed.
283
 Furthermore, rare diseases for which a 
previously approved orphan product has been shown to be highly profitable are more likely to 
invite competition, and the more prevalent rare diseases are more likely to have subsequent 
treatments developed and marketed.
284
 
 Additionally, even for diseases for which there is only a single approved treatment, it is 
not necessarily accurate to say that market exclusivity has created a monopoly for that disease. 
Rare disorders can lead to the appearance of a monopoly regardless of any exclusivity rights 
being granted, simply because small markets are less likely to attract competitors.
285
 At least one 
member of the pharmaceutical industry argues that what appears to be a monopoly may in fact be 
merely a reflection of either a market that is too small to draw additional drug developers, or that 
insufficient time has passed to allow for a competitor to successfully develop a different drug 
and enter the market.
286
 Therefore, while high prices for orphan drugs are indeed a problem, it is 
not necessarily true that market exclusivity causes the high prices. Even the recent Kaiser Health 
News report, which is highly critical of market exclusivity and the high prices of orphan drugs, 
acknowledges that it “is difficult to say exactly how or if orphan exclusivity affects the price of 
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Humira [an orphan drug]...”287 This point is important because it would be unwise to not 
implement what has been shown to be an effective incentive if exclusivity is not actually 
contributing to the problem of high prices. 
 A number of factors likely work in conjunction to inform drug pricing decisions, thereby 
making it difficult to identify unreasonable drug prices.
288
 While not necessarily the case for all 
orphan drugs, it can be incredibly expensive to successfully develop and produce safe and 
effective treatments for a very limited patient population.
289
  A number of features specific to 
rare diseases can make the development and testing of treatments particularly challenging and, 
therefore, costly to pharmaceutical companies.
290
 From the perspective of the pharmaceutical 
industry, the high prices of orphan drugs are necessary because of the additional risks and 
challenges associated with developing, testing, and marketing orphan drugs.
291
 A small market, 
such as that for an orphan disease, naturally creates the need to charge a higher price in order to 
profit from one’s investment because costs cannot be spread among a large group of buyers.292 
Without the protection provided by an exclusivity period, developers would be even less likely to 
recover their R&D investment and make a profit from orphan drugs.  
 On the other hand, other authors suggest that the prices of orphan drugs are artificially 
high,
293
 that developing and bringing orphan drugs to market is no longer the financially risky 
endeavour it was once thought to be, and that orphan drugs can actually be highly profitable.
294
 
Orphan drugs may in fact be more profitable than non-orphan drugs because of a number of 
factors that both increase potential revenue (e.g. higher price points, larger market shares, 
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exclusivity protection, and faster uptake) and decrease development costs (e.g. shorter and 
smaller clinical trials, fee waivers, and subsidies).
295
 These factors call into question the claims 
from the pharmaceutical industry that orphan drug development remains a risky and costly 
investment. Furthermore, some orphan drugs are effective treatments for multiple indications, 
including some common diseases, and therefore have a relatively large pool of potential 
buyers.
296
 Just because a drug treats one extremely rare disease does not necessarily mean that 
the drug will yield a low return on investment overall when one considers all the other 
indications for which the drug may be approved. In other words, “the small number of patients 
treated with an orphan drug and the limited economic viability of orphan drugs can be 
questioned in a number of cases.”297 
 The preceding discussion shows that orphan drugs are not a homogenous group; some 
orphan drugs represent highly lucrative investments while others will be barely profitable at all. 
While there is some evidence that companies will set lower prices when there are multiple 
competing treatments available,
298
 this does not lead directly to the conclusion that the drug 
prices were unjustifiably high to begin with.  Arguments that orphan drugs are overly expensive, 
based on the fact that companies reduce their prices when they face competition in the market,
299
  
over-simplify the issue and are not accurate with respect to all orphan drugs.  
 It is not necessarily accurate to say that market exclusivity gives a developer a monopoly 
over a disease. It is more likely that the costs of orphan drug development combined with a 
smaller market also “encourages” high prices, not entirely the market exclusivity period itself. 
This point is important because it speaks to how to most effectively address the problem of 
patient access. As market exclusivity allows high prices then it would be more useful to seek to 
lower the costs of orphan drug development. Interfering with exclusivities is unlikely to 
significantly improve patient access if the costs of orphan drug development are not also 
decreased. Subsidizing orphan drug development will be addressed in further detail below, in 
Chapter 6. Furthermore, it is at least possible that this will be less of an issue in Canada because, 
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unlike the United States, Canada does have a price control mechanism that is intended to prevent 
companies from charging excessively high prices for pharmaceuticals.
300
  
4.3.3  Concerns about Exploitation of Market Exclusivity 
 The high prices of many orphan drugs invite close scrutiny and there has been renewed 
criticism about orphan drug policy in general, and market exclusivity in particular.
301
 Market 
exclusivity has been criticized as encouraging exploitation by pharmaceutical companies. This 
line of criticism stems largely from two core concerns about how the exclusivity provisions 
function: one, multiple exclusivity periods can be obtained for the same orphan drug and two, 
obtaining market exclusivity is not related to any additional costs or risks being incurred to 
develop and market an orphan drug. Some authors argue that pharmaceutical companies exploit 
orphan drug policy by obtaining multiple periods of exclusivity for the same drug, a practice that 
is permitted when the drug is approved to treat another orphan indication.
302
 This concern has 
become particularly pressing in the wake of scientific advances that allow for more precise 
identification of distinct orphan indications.
303
 The second concern relates to the original 
justification for having orphan drug incentives, with some authors considering that the incentives 
are no longer necessary because the development of orphan drugs no longer incurs the same 
degree of risk and additional cost.
304
 This second argument has already been addressed above, in 
Chapter 3.
305
 The following paragraphs consider the issue of granting multiple exclusivity 
periods for the same orphan drug.  
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 Both the ODA and the European Union Regulations permit a company to obtain multiple 
exclusivity periods for the same drug (provided it can be shown to be a safe and effective 
treatment for multiple orphan conditions).
306
 Permitting multiple exclusivities for the same drug 
is not necessarily problematic in and of itself because it requires a company to undertake 
additional clinical trials and incur the costs associated with obtaining approval for other uses and 
may, therefore, be an appropriate application of the incentive.
307
 However, advances in the field 
of pharmacogenomics since orphan drug policies were first implemented have compounded this 
concern.
308
 Pharmacogenomics can be used to sub-divide a disease population in order to create 
distinct groups of patients with less than 200, 000 people (i.e. “creating” an orphan disease that 
did not previously exist).
309
 The opportunity to obtain multiple exclusivity periods for each 
designated orphan disease is sometimes seen as encouraging this practice of “salami slicing”,310 
and some authors argue that these scientific advancements need to be accounted for by making 
amendments to the current orphan drug regulations.
311
 However, it is debateable whether this is a 
problem or an advantage of orphan disease policy.  
 On the one hand, patients may benefit from the increased attention on their specific rare 
disease subset. Recall that more scientific knowledge about a disease increases the likelihood 
that a drug will be developed to treat that specific disease.
312
 This supports the assertion that the 
use of pharmacogenomics to increasingly identify narrower disease targets should be regarded as 
“an achievement [of orphan drug policies] rather than a handicap or nuisance.”313 Increasing 
interest, and therefore investment, in rare diseases was the point of enacting an orphan drug 
policy; doing so ensured that these diseases are no longer being “orphaned” by the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
 On the other hand, the practice of splitting a disease into subcategories may in essence be 
artificially creating an orphan disease, something pharmaceutical companies may be inclined to 
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do specifically in order to access the related incentives. This can be considered to be misaligned 
with the spirit of orphan disease policy.
314
 Increased stratification of diseases is alleged to be 
overburdening the rare disease regime, with the result that common diseases are being 
“artificially” classified as rare and exclusivity protection is being granted where it is not truly 
warranted (i.e. for diseases that would not otherwise be neglected in the absence of 
incentives).
315
 There is some evidence indicating that drugs for biomarker-defined disease 
subsets require less time and money to develop, fueling concerns that companies are taking 
advantage of the prevalence-based definition of “orphan” in order to access incentives.316 
Exploitation of the rules for profit does in fact appear to be an unintended consequence of orphan 
drug incentives.
317
 For example, the European Regulations permit products that have been used 
for many years to be subsequently authorized as orphan products with relatively little 
developmental work (but with great cost to individual patients and/or their health care payers) 
and for schemes that are meant to reward socially valuable innovation this potential exploitation 
is troublesome.
318
 
4.4  Recommendations for Implementing Market Exclusivity in Canada 
4.4.1  Addressing the Affordability Issue 
 Modifying the rules that govern exclusivity protection may address the issue of high 
prices for orphan drugs, but only to the extent that the prices are actually related to exclusivity 
periods. One suggestion to promote affordable access to orphan drugs is to provide shorter 
periods of market exclusivity.
319
 This suggestion is made under the, fairly reasonable, 
expectation that companies will have to lower their prices when the period of exclusivity ends in 
order to avoid losing all of the market sales to a competitor who sells the same drug at a reduced 
price.
320
 To the extent that drug companies could not rely on price increases to recoup costs, 
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significantly shorter exclusivity terms could impair the effectiveness of the incentive altogether, 
by once again making orphan drug development unprofitable and causing the pharmaceutical 
industry to lose interest in the orphan drug market.  
 A better solution, at least in theory, would be to grant longer periods of exclusivity. This 
is likely to be an unpopular recommendation, one that relates back to the question of whether or 
not market exclusivity encourages high prices. Market exclusivity at least allows companies to 
charge as much as they think they can get, for as long as the exclusivity period lasts. In theory, 
lengthening the period of exclusivity could encourage companies to set lower prices because 
they would have a longer period of time during which they would not have to share the market 
with a competitor selling the same drug to the same group of patients.  
 Longer periods of exclusivity are a reasonable policy solution provided that the claims of 
those in the industry, that market protection is necessary to off-set the additional risks and costs 
of orphan drug development and that orphan drug prices are an honest reflection of what 
companies need to charge in order to make orphan drug development profitable,
321
 are correct. 
As discussed above, in all likelihood orphan drug prices are probably justified in some cases and 
not in others. Accordingly, providing a longer period of exclusivity should be done in 
conjunction with the possibility of extinguishing market protection once a drug becomes 
“sufficiently profitable” because this should discourage companies from pricing their drugs 
overly high.
322
 This is provided for by the European Union Regulations, though some 
clarification of the term “sufficiently profitable” is necessary.323 For example, it would need to 
be determined whether “sufficiently profitable” means that a company has recovered its R&D 
costs, or that they have recovered their costs and made a specified amount of profit. It has been 
suggested that the threat of reducing the length of exclusivity might impair the effectiveness of 
the incentive.
324
 However, the effectiveness of market exclusivity would likely be weakened only 
if the provision were to be vague and companies uncertain about how and when it would be 
applied.  
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 A significant limitation of this recommendation is the lack of transparency surrounding 
the pricing of orphan drugs,
325
 and this limitation would need to be addressed in order for the 
potential termination of exclusivity to have an impact on orphan drug pricing. The information 
and knowledge imbalance as between drug developers and the regulatory authority would likely 
result in some orphan products remaining unnecessarily protected by market exclusivity. There 
would also be the possibility that companies that are more forthcoming about their R&D costs 
would be “punished” by having their market exclusivity terminated while competitors who 
intentionally withhold information keep their protection intact. It is unclear whether or not this 
possibility could be addressed through legislation, for example by putting the onus of justifying 
continued protection on the company (e.g. by requiring an accounting of costs and profits 
halfway through the exclusivity period), though such a requirement is unlikely to be popular with 
the pharmaceutical industry and could impair the effectiveness of market exclusivity as an 
incentive for orphan drugs. 
 Additionally, any positive impact of terminating market exclusivity for sufficiently 
profitable orphan drugs hinges on Health Canada’s ability to collect financial information from 
companies post-approval and to enforce post-approval requirements. Assessments of Health 
Canada’s administration of its Notice of Compliance with Conditions (“NOC/c”) policy may 
provide helpful insight regarding how well the agency can be expected to determine whether an 
orphan drug has become sufficiently profitable and terminate market exclusivity accordingly. 
The NOC/c program is intended to accelerate the approval of treatments for rare and serious 
conditions where patients may benefit from earlier access even though clinical trials have not yet 
demonstrated that the product has a clinical benefit.
326
 Under the NOC/c program, drugs can be 
approved for market based on clinical trials showing efficacy on a surrogate outcome, as 
opposed to a demonstration that the drug has a clinical benefit, subject to certain post-marketing 
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conditions (a common condition being that the drug company supply evidence that the drug 
actually does provide a clinical benefit).
327
 Lexchin and Law both found that it is not unusual for 
conditions to remain unfulfilled for many years, seemingly without any action taken to enforce 
the conditions.
328
 That being said, under the NOC/c policy conditions are enforced by 
withdrawing market approval for the drug in question, which Law notes is a drastic, “all-or-
nothing” measure that Health Canada may be hesitant to take.329 Terminating market exclusivity 
would be a less drastic means of applying the provision, and the onus of providing information 
could be placed on the drug company (by automatically terminating market exclusivity at a 
specific time unless the company provides evidence that the drug is not sufficiently profitable).  
4.4.2  Addressing Concerns about Exploitation of Orphan Drug Policies 
 The potential for exploitation, particularly to the extent that it has been compounded by 
scientific advances, indicates that orphan drug policies in their current form are somewhat 
outdated. As originally enacted, the ODA does not appear to have contemplated potential 
exploitation in this manner. While greater attention to specific disease subsets may be beneficial 
to patients, Canada should take advantage of hindsight by introducing a more nuanced incentive 
scheme that will account for the scientific advances that have generated concerns about abuse of 
orphan drug incentives by pharmaceutical companies.  
 It was concluded above that market exclusivity regulation in Canada should include the 
possibility of terminating the period of exclusivity once a drug becomes “sufficiently profitable”. 
Building on this recommendation, determinations of “sufficiently profitable” should take into 
account profitability from multiple indications for which a drug is approved.
330
 Typically, the 
prevalence of these combined indications are not “added up” when determining how profitable a 
drug is, and it has been convincingly argued that doing so would better align with the spirit of the 
legislation.
331
 Not “adding up” profitability from multiple indications when assessing the 
profitability of an orphan drug assumes that a developer is incurring roughly equivalent 
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additional costs and risks for each subsequent orphan indication, an assumption that was 
probably reasonable when these policies were originally enacted. If this assumption is correct, 
then considering each use of an orphan drug as separate is reasonable; it would make sense to 
assess whether Drug X as a treatment for Disease A is sufficiently profitable by only considering 
the profits made by selling Drug X as a treatment for Disease A.  
 It is not necessarily appropriate to assess profitability by considering all indications for 
which a drug is approved, particularly when the indications relate to very different diseases and 
would have involved significant additional costs to test. However, “adding up” profits is 
appropriate where the approvals have been essentially “built off” the first approval and the 
associated clinical testing such that the subsequent approvals required relatively less risk and 
cost to obtain. Conducting clinical trials for a drug to treat bio-marker defined disease subsets 
does in fact appear to be quicker and cheaper.
332
 Where Drug X is approved to treat Diseases 
A(1), A(2), and so on, with each distinct orphan disease being a bio-marker defined subset of 
Disease A, it would be logical to add up the associated costs and profits for the purpose of 
determining whether Drug X is “sufficiently profitable” that termination of the exclusivity period 
is warranted. In these circumstances, the identification of each disease subset and the associated 
drug development would have built off each other, and the associated risks and costs would be 
highly related. A Canadian market exclusivity regime should, therefore, clearly state that the 
assessment of a drug’s profitability will take into consideration all of the bio-marker defined 
disease subsets for which a drug is approved.
333
  
 As with the issue of availability, it will be difficult to significantly deter misuse of orphan 
drug policy by making amendments at the individual incentive level. To meaningfully deter 
exploitation, changes need to be made at the orphan drug designation stage, for example by 
restricting what type of drugs will be given orphan status.
334
 In the alternative, it is possible that 
the potential for exploitation is simply a price that has to be paid in order for market exclusivity 
to be a sufficiently effective incentive. While it may go against the spirit of the legislation, given 
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the increased development of treatments for patients with rare diseases, whether or not this is 
actually detrimental to public health outcomes is open to debate. 
4.5 Summary 
 Market exclusivity appears to be an effective incentive to promote investment in rare 
disease treatments. As Canadian patients still face a significant time lag between when orphan 
drugs are approved in other jurisdictions and when they become available on the Canadian 
market,
335
 market exclusivity should be introduced in Canada as an orphan drug incentive. This 
will hopefully encourage drug developers to at least market their orphan drug products in 
Canada. 
 As affordable access to approved treatments remains a problem, measures should be 
taken to address the exceptionally high prices of orphan drugs. This could include lengthening 
periods of exclusivity, which although it seems counterintuitive, could ultimately result in lower 
prices by allowing a longer period in which the drug’s sponsor can recoup its investment. In 
order to alleviate some public policy concerns, and attempt to discourage over-pricing, the period 
of exclusivity should be terminated once a drug becomes “sufficiently profitable,” with this 
assessment taking into account profits from all related disease subsets. The potential to exploit 
orphan drug policy by “salami-slicing” diseases, while ostensibly misaligned with the spirit of 
orphan drug policy, may actually improve patient health outcomes in the long run by generating 
greater attention to disease subsets.  
 The above recommendations, to lengthen the exclusivity period and provide the 
possibility that it will be terminated, are unlikely to cause orphan drug prices to drop 
dramatically; any modifications to market exclusivity provisions can only be expected to temper 
some unreasonably high prices. While market exclusivity would likely have some positive 
impact in Canada, its implementation should not be done in isolation. It should be implemented 
with complementary measures that also more widely disperse the costs of the incentive. To 
elaborate, market exclusivity is “paid for” by consumers of orphan drugs (and any third party 
paying for those orphan drugs), to the extent that it contributes to higher prices. The moral 
imperative and commitment to equality that justify having orphan drug incentives in the first 
place also justify spreading the cost of incentives beyond the very patients that are intended as 
                                                          
335
 During which time patients must apply to the SAP, and pay for the drugs themselves in order 
to access drugs that are not approved in Canada.  
59 
 
the primary beneficiaries of orphan drug policies. Both PRVs and tax credits for orphan drug 
development more widely distribute the burden of paying for the incentives. These 
complementary measures are discussed in the following two Chapters.  
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CHAPTER 5: INCENTIVE OPTION 2 – PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS 
5.1  Introduction 
 Compared to market exclusivity, PRVs are relatively novel incentives that are used in the 
United States to encourage pharmaceutical innovation in circumstances where market failures 
have otherwise led to medical needs being neglected. As with market exclusivity, PRVs 
supplement patent law as an incentive for drug development. PRVs operate as a “pull strategy” 
to encourage drug development because they reward research output (i.e. by increasing financial 
returns), as opposed to a “push strategy” (one that would subsidize research input).336 A PRV 
entitles a drug sponsor to have a new drug application (“NDA”) subject to priority review by the 
FDA, as opposed to standard review.
337
 Priority review is typically reserved for drugs that are 
expected to provide a significant benefit over existing treatments,
338
 and a voucher allows a drug 
developer to circumvent this criterion. The FDA’s goal is to complete a priority review of a 
NDA within 6 months.
339
 As the FDA typically takes about 10 months to complete a standard 
review,
340
 priority review of a NDA can allow a sponsor to market, and profit from, their product 
within an accelerated timeframe (provided that they are successful in obtaining market 
authorisation). Priority review can also allow a company to beat a competitor to the market. 
There are currently three programs under which PRVs are available: neglected tropical diseases, 
rare pediatric diseases, and, most recently, for medical countermeasures.
341
  
 This Chapter will proceed as follows: Section 5.2 describes how the voucher programs 
came to be implemented and the vouchers that have been awarded and sold thus far; Sections 5.3  
and 5.4 provide a critical analysis of the voucher program, first from the perspective of public 
policy concerns, then by considering the impact and effect of the programs; Section 5.5 considers 
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how PRVs would function as an orphan drug incentive in Canada; finally, Section 5.6 
summarizes the issues and conclusions reached in this Chapter.  
5.2  The Development and Adoption of Priority Review Vouchers 
 The idea for PRVs as an incentive for pharmaceutical development was originally 
proposed by David B Ridley, Henry G Grabowski and Jeffrey L Moe, a trio of academics based 
out of Duke University, in a 2006 article published in Health Affairs.
342
 In this article they 
describe how market failures have resulted in tropical diseases being neglected by the 
pharmaceutical industry.
343
 Infectious and parasitic diseases are typically suffered by people 
living in low-income countries and, therefore, there is little financial incentive for companies to 
invest in developing treatments for these diseases.
344
 As with rare diseases, tropical diseases are 
unlikely to be a profitable investment and therefore have been neglected by pharmaceutical 
companies.
345
 In order to address this problem Ridley, Grabowski, and Moe proposed that a 
voucher for FDA priority review be awarded to drug sponsors who develop and register with the 
FDA treatments for tropical diseases.
346
 In order to be eligible for a voucher, the proposed 
voucher program would have required that companies forgo patent rights, and have at least one 
manufacturer for the product.
347
 These particular eligibility requirements ultimately were not 
included in the enacted legislation. Following this proposal, the Tropical Disease Priority Review 
Voucher program was formally introduced in 2007.
348
 In order to be eligible, a drug must be 
intended for the treatment or prevention of a designated tropical disease.
349
 There is a list of 
targeted diseases from which drug eligibility will be determined, though additional diseases can 
be, and have been, added to this list by order of the Secretary.
350
 Drugs must also be eligible for 
priority review, in other words, be expected to provide a significant benefit over existing 
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(previously approved) treatments in terms of safety or effectiveness,
351
  in order to qualify for a 
voucher.
352
 
 Pediatric populations have also historically been neglected by companies when 
conducting clinical trials and, therefore, safety and efficacy information about the use of drugs 
that are approved for use by adults in pediatric populations is lacking.
353
 Furthermore, there is 
also a dearth of drug development for diseases, rare or otherwise, that specifically occur in 
pediatric populations.
354
 A voucher program for rare pediatric diseases (“RPDs”) was, therefore, 
subsequently introduced in 2012 via the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation 
Act (“FDASIA”).355 An RPD is defined as a rare disease that is serious or life-threatening “in 
which the serious or life-threatening manifestations primarily affect individuals aged from birth 
to 18 years, including age groups often called neonates, infants, children, and adolescents.”356 
This is not the first FDA incentive directed at improving the treatment options for pediatric 
populations. “Pediatric exclusivity” provides an additional six months of exclusivity to 
companies who conduct studies of new and previously approved drugs with pediatric 
populations.
357
 As with the tropical disease program, RPD treatments must qualify for priority 
review in order to be eligible for a voucher.
358
 A formal assessment of the effectiveness of the 
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RPD program was mandated and completed by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
in 2016.
359
 The RPD voucher program included a sunset clause that would have terminated the 
program in 2015,
360
 but the 21
st
 Century Cures Act, enacted in 2016, extended the program until 
September 30, 2020.
361
 That Act also introduced a third PRV program, one for material threat 
medical countermeasures,
362
 and requires that a more detailed evaluation of all three voucher 
programs be completed by the GAO and submitted by January 31, 2020.
363
 
 There are conditions on the use of vouchers under all three programs; presumably these 
were included in the legislation in order to mitigate the additional workload that vouchers are 
expected to impose on the FDA. In order to redeem a PRV, a sponsor must pay an additional 
priority review user fee, the amount of which is to be based on the difference between the 
average cost incurred by the FDA in the previous year of reviewing a New Drug Application  
according to its standard review process and the average cost to perform a priority review.
364
 The 
FDA is in charge of setting this price each fiscal year, and amounts have ranged from $2,325,000 
in 2014 to $5,280,000 in 2012.
365
 The RPD priority review fee for 2017 was $2,706,000.
366
 
Sponsors also have to give the FDA 90 days notice of their intention to redeem a PRV, in order 
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to give the agency sufficient time to organize its resources and plan its review strategy.
367
 The 
tropical disease voucher program originally required advance notice of 365 days but subsequent 
amendments have reduced this to 90 days.
368
 Drug sponsors who have been awarded a voucher 
may either use the voucher themselves or transfer it to another company.
369
 The tropical disease 
voucher program, as originally enacted, stated that vouchers could only be transferred once,
370
 
though this has since been amended and the FDA has specified that all PRVS may be the subject 
of an unlimited number of transfers.
371
 Allowing transfers, unlimited or otherwise, is important 
because companies that develop eligible drugs may not necessarily have a potential 
“blockbuster” drug in its portfolio (or any other drug for that matter) and therefore a sale would 
be the only way for it to benefit from being awarded a voucher.  
 As of November 2017, 16 priority vouchers have been awarded, 11 for rare pediatric 
diseases and five for tropical diseases.
372
 Novartis was the first company to redeem a voucher, 
for its gouty arthritis medication, but the company did not ultimately obtain market approval any 
faster; instead, the FDA requested that more data be submitted in support of the company’s 
NDA.
373
 This caused some further concern about the utility of the voucher program.
374
 Since 
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then, a number of companies have held on to their vouchers, though at least five vouchers have 
been  sold, at prices ranging from $67 million up to $350 million.
375
 Several companies appear to 
have benefited from using a voucher. For example, Sanofi-Aventis purchased a PRV from 
BioMarin for $67 million and used it to get Praluent, a cholesterol-lowering drug, on the market 
before a competitor; as sales for this drug are expected to be $2 billion annually, getting to 
market six months earlier may have earned the company an additional $1 billion.
376
 
 As evidenced by the recent expansion to the voucher program to include medical 
countermeasures,
377
 and discussions about proactively expanding the list of eligible tropical 
diseases,
378
 vouchers are a politically popular incentive.
379
 This may be largely because, at least 
at first glance, they appear to be cost-free.
380
 However, for a number of reasons, many academics 
urge caution and restraint when considering further augmentations to the voucher program. Some 
argue that expanding the voucher program will drive down the market value of vouchers and 
therefore reduce the effectiveness of the incentive,
381
 while other argue that vouchers are 
unlikely to be effective at all and that the use of vouchers incurs unacceptable costs and risks.
382
 
The following sections describe the concerns raised in the literature about PRV programs and 
attempts to critically analyze the arguments for and against using vouchers to encourage orphan 
drug development.  
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5.3 PRVs May Create Concerns Regarding Drug Safety and Agency Autonomy 
 Putting aside, for the moment, questions about the effectiveness of the voucher programs, 
this section considers whether PRVs are fundamentally flawed from a public policy perspective 
to such an extent that they should not be used regardless of their effect. Recall that vouchers are 
intended to function as a “pull” mechanism; they reward behaviour by creating a financial 
incentive as a prize for socially desirable outcomes. This is considered by some to be, in and of 
itself, problematic because “such initiatives may achieve short-term gains, but they do not 
consistently lead to sustained improvement and may have important unintended 
consequences”383 because they rely on the desire of pharmaceutical companies to increase its 
profits. Specifically, Kesselheim argues that sustainable interest in rare disease drug 
development is unlikely to result from financial incentives because unanticipated changes in the 
pharmaceutical industry that decrease the value of an incentive would likely prompt companies 
to cease with any drug development projects initiated in response to that incentive.
 384
  Market 
exclusivity is also a “pull” incentive and, as was made apparent in the discussion above, does 
seem to have incurred some unintended consequences such as the complications introduced by 
scientific advances that permit “salami slicing” of diseases, though whether exclusivity has led to 
only short-term gains is debateable. Critics have also stated that vouchers would be questionable 
from a public policy perspective, regardless of whether or not they are effective, citing increased 
safety risks associated with priority review as a fundamental problem with voucher programs.
385
 
This section first addresses concerns about the FDA’s priority review process in general and how 
these concerns might be strengthened when vouchers are redeemed before discussing issues that 
are specific to the voucher programs. 
5.3.1  Potential Safety Issues with “Vouchered” Drugs 
 Potential safety issues with drugs that have been subjected to a priority review represent a 
major concern about PRVs, and FDA officials have in fact questioned the wisdom of subjecting 
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potential “blockbuster drugs” to priority review.386 The term “blockbuster drug” refers to drugs 
that make over $1 billion in sales within five years of being on the market.
387
 Pressure to review 
applications for blockbuster drugs within a limited, six-month time-frame may indeed create 
legitimate concerns about the safety of “vouchered” drugs because “there is a different benefit-
risk balance to be considered” when reviewing drugs that will likely be widely used.388 The 
drugs for which vouchers are most likely to be redeemed are ones that are expected to be used by 
millions of patients, such as drugs to treat Type II diabetes and high cholesterol, and therefore 
are typically submitted for approval with applications that are much more complex and take 
longer to review.
389
 Additionally, drugs that are granted priority review status based on their own 
merits are drugs that are expected to address an unmet medical need and the risk-benefit analysis 
performed by the FDA takes this into account.
390
  Vouchers will be redeemed for drugs that 
would not otherwise qualify for priority review and, therefore, the increased risk of an expedited 
process may not be balanced by the increased benefit that is expected where an unmet medical 
need is present.  
 That being said, the increased risk associated with priority review may not be as great as 
some suggest. As mentioned above, Novartis was the first company to redeem a voucher, and in 
that case rather than granting approval, the agency instead requested that more data be submitted 
in support of the application.
391
 This example suggests that the FDA is not necessarily going to 
compromise on its safety standards when conducting priority reviews of vouchered drugs.
392
 The 
priority review system is not new, and it is unclear whether or not the priority review of potential 
blockbuster drugs truly creates a safety problem, with some authors stating that safety concerns 
are likely to be unfounded given that the FDA already “fast-tracks” drugs through priority 
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review.
393
 As noted in the original proposal for PRVs, faster review by the FDA does not mean 
that the safety and efficacy standards for approval are lowered.
394
  
 NDAs approved by the FDA between November 21, 1997 and December 31, 2009 that 
underwent priority review were more likely to subsequently receive a post-marketing boxed 
warning than drugs that were given standard review during that time, but not more likely to 
result in serious post-marketing safety incidents compared with drugs that receive standard 
review.
395
 The authors attribute the association between priority review and subsequent boxed 
warnings to the fact that priority review is granted only for drugs that treat serious conditions and 
are expected to “provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness”; 396  as such, any 
benefits of such drugs may outweigh serious safety risks, thereby making it more likely that 
drugs that have warranted priority review will subsequently receive boxed warnings. These 
findings align with the FDA’s assertion that drugs that receive priority review have different 
risk-benefit considerations than potential blockbuster drugs.
397 
While the priority review process 
itself may not create an additional safety risk, there may be some cause for concern about 
granting drugs priority review status that would not otherwise merit an accelerated review.  
 Overall, there seems to be little concrete evidence to support the argument that vouchers 
will in fact compromise the safety of drugs for which a voucher has been redeemed. That being 
said, as the FDA is the agency tasked with conducting drug reviews, some acknowledgement of 
the concerns expressed by agency staff is warranted. FDA experts are likely the most qualified to 
say whether or not there are safety concerns with the agency’s priority review process. 
Furthermore, the findings of previous investigations into the safety of priority reviewed drugs 
cannot necessarily be translated to the blockbuster drugs for which vouchers are most likely to be 
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redeemed. As it stands, it remains to be seen whether the voucher programs will actually create a 
safety problem. The mandated report of all three voucher programs should help to inform this 
issue. In the meantime, recall that vouchers are not a guarantee of either a shorter review time or 
that FDA will grant market approval.
398
 
5.3.2 Indirect Costs of Voucher Programs 
 Voucher programs have been defended on the grounds that they “[do] not require public 
funds”,399 but critics have noted that this is a misconception.400 Voucher programs rush non-
priority drugs (i.e. drugs for which there is not an urgent public health need) to the market, 
thereby resulting in a longer time during which taxpayer-funded health care plans must pay for 
them.
401
 While vouchers technically operate off-budget, they are not “free” in the broader sense 
because the value of a voucher comes from the ability to get a drug to market more quickly, and 
the additional costs of early entry to the market are paid for by drug consumers, both directly and 
indirectly through insurance payments, as well as by taxpayers in general via government-funded 
pharmaceutical cost-assistance programs.
402
 That being said, such costs may be mitigated to the 
extent that generic versions of a vouchered drug will also be available on the market earlier 
because the effective patent life of a drug for which a voucher was used is not impacted much, if 
at all, by an accelerated review.
403
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 Interestingly, in the original proposal for PRVs, the accelerated approval and marketing 
of blockbuster drugs was suggested as an advantage of voucher programs because consumers 
would have faster access to blockbuster drugs, including faster access to generic versions.
404
 
Whether faster access to blockbuster drugs actually provides a significant benefit to patients is 
questionable and will vary drug by drug. Some blockbuster drugs are likely to have such a 
significant therapeutic advantage over previously existing treatments that speeding them to 
market via a PRV will be beneficial to the general public. For other drugs, ones that offer little 
therapeutic advantage or create a potential safety risk, this will not be the case. It is, therefore, 
uncertain whether speeding blockbuster drugs to market is generally an advantage or 
disadvantage of voucher programs. Regardless, what needs to be borne in mind is that voucher 
programs are not, as they may initially appear to be, cost-free. The cost to be paid (in the form of 
earlier and therefore longer payments for blockbuster drugs) may or may not be acceptable, but it 
certainly is a cost that policy-makers should consider.  
5.3.3 Additional Burden on FDA Reviewers 
 Priority review does not entail a different assessment of the safety and efficacy of a drug, 
it only means that the FDA will perform the same assessment within a shortened timeframe, 
which will naturally require more resources.  It is conceivable that vouchers will slow the review 
of drugs for which priority status is actually warranted by redirecting FDA resources to meet the 
demand of a voucher redemption.
405
 As described above, sponsors who wish to redeem a PRV 
must pay a special user fee to the FDA, which is intended to off-set the additional costs involved 
in giving priority to a NDA.
406
 The 90 day notice requirement is also intended to reduce undue 
strain on the agency by allowing time to allocate its resources accordingly.
407
 However, some 
academics argue that these measures are insufficient to alleviate the additional workload because 
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it “will not change the institutional hiring and organizational parameters that ultimately shape 
FDA’s review capabilities.”408 The user fee also risks incurring cuts to the FDA’s budget 
because the payment is added to an offsetting collections account, which may prompt the 
appropriations committee to reduce the FDA budget.
409
 While it is not yet clear whether this will 
actually occur, the reality is that in any event the FDA cannot simply hire more reviewers each 
time a voucher is submitted.  According to the Director of FDA’s Office of New Drugs, the user 
fee will not address the additional workload because the 90 days notice that a company must give 
before redeeming a voucher does not allow the agency sufficient time to hire and train the 
additional staff members, nor would it be reasonable to hire additional reviewers only to let them 
go after the priority review is completed and the additional burden caused by a voucher 
redemption is relieved.
410
  
 At the moment, the FDA’s workload-related complaints about the voucher program are 
not corroborated by the evidence.
411
 At least one study has found that the FDA “has been able to 
maintain [its] standards for reviewing drug applications on schedule” and that “the FDA has 
continued to function efficiently and effectively at drug approval, despite the increased workload 
generated by PRVs.”412 The GAO report regarding all three voucher programs, due by the end of 
January 2020, must include an analysis of the extent to which vouchers impact FDA’s ability to 
complete its review of other drugs. 
413
 As with the potential safety concerns discussed above, 
increases to FDA workload are a potential concern that warrants ongoing attention and 
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monitoring, but at this stage it is too early to consider this to be a serious issue with voucher 
programs.  
5.3.4  Interference with FDA Priority Setting 
 Voucher programs are particularly unique because they directly involve the FDA “as an 
integral component of the economic incentive.”414 Whether this is an appropriate use of a 
government function is certainly open to debate. “Linking an essential government public health 
function – namely the regulatory review of investigational drugs – with a way of generating 
monetary value for private companies” 415 may be inherently problematic regardless of how 
effective the incentive may be. A frequent criticism is that the voucher programs interfere with 
the FDA’s ability to set its own priorities with respect to reviewing drugs. 416 Normally, priority 
review, and the associated additional expense, is reserved for drugs for which there is an urgent 
public health need, i.e. those that deserve priority.
417
 The submission of a voucher has the effect 
of disrupting this process.  For what it is worth, the FDA has explicitly stated that the agency 
does not support the continuation of the voucher programs and would prefer that other incentives 
(e.g. pediatric exclusivity) be used.
 418
 The GAO report on the RPD voucher program includes 
statements from the FDA that “the [voucher] program interferes with its ability to set priorities 
on the basis of public health needs” and that, by allowing companies to effectively purchase a 
priority review the program “undermines FDA’s public health mission and the morale of its 
professional review staff.”419  
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 Voucher programs will undoubtedly interfere with the FDA’s autonomy with respect to 
setting its own priorities and allocating resources for the review of NDAs. While the concerns 
expressed by the FDA should be taken into consideration, without clear evidence that vouchers 
are actually having a detrimental impact on FDA performance, this concern is speculative. In a 
sense, priority setting arguably is occurring, in that Congress has deemed it appropriate to award 
the products that are the targets of the voucher programs, and it is not clear that the FDA is better 
equipped to set priorities. In order to accurately assess the impact of PRVs more information is 
needed about whether or not the voucher programs actually interfere with the FDA’s ability to 
prioritize drugs based on their own merits, i.e. those for which there truly is an urgent public 
health need.
420
 The recently mandated GAO report, due in 2020, should provide further 
insight.
421
 In the interim, perhaps concerns can be alleviated by early observations indicating that 
the FDA is still functioning well in spite of the voucher programs.
422
  
5.3.5  Access to the Drugs that Qualify for a Voucher  
 Finally, what may be the most common complaint about PRVs is that the programs do 
not specifically promote affordable access to qualifying drugs.
423
 The guidance for the tropical 
disease voucher program makes it clear that there is no requirement whatsoever to market or 
distribute a drug for which a voucher is awarded.
424
 Under the RPD program, a sponsor who 
does not market their qualifying RPD drug within one year of receiving market approval will risk 
having the FDA revoke the voucher.
425
 More importantly, however, voucher programs do not 
require companies to market qualifying drugs at affordable prices.
426
 The ultimate goal of 
pharmaceutical incentives, including vouchers, must be to get safe and effective treatments to 
patients who need them. In light of this, it seems incongruent that the eligibility criterion does 
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not require any effort be made by the drug developer to achieve this.
427
 PRVs, as with market 
exclusivity, arguably do promote access to a certain extent because a company is only eligible 
for a voucher (or exclusivity) once it applies for market approval. Obtaining market approval 
may be seen as the final step that must be taken to make drugs available to patients. However, as 
discussed above, availability on the market does not necessarily equate to affordable access to a 
treatment. Unlike market exclusivity and its potentially monopoly-related price effects, voucher 
programs likely will not contribute to high prices for orphan drugs, but in any event vouchers do 
not explicitly promote affordable access. As with many orphan drugs, some of the products for 
which vouchers have been awarded are incredibly expensive. For example, Vimizim, for which 
the first RPD voucher was awarded, costs $380,000 per patient annually, making it one of the top 
five most expensive drugs in the world.
428
 As such, it is questionable whether vouchers will 
actually have a positive impact on patient health outcomes. 
 It is possible that the issue of affordable access needs to be addressed by amending the 
legislation. One suggestion to address the access problem has been to require that drug 
developers forego patent rights in order to be eligible for a voucher.
429
 The original proposal for 
PRVs did in fact contemplate such a requirement.
430
 This requirement, which probably could 
have made some headway to facilitate access to qualifying treatments, did not ultimately make it 
into the legislation, probably because it would have been extremely unpopular with the 
pharmaceutical industry. To be fair, the lack of popularity may signal that the incentive effect 
would be dampened if patent protection were lost. A more common suggestion is to require that 
companies show the FDA a plan to make their drug accessible.
431
 As originally proposed by 
Ridley, Grabowski and Moe, voucher programs would have required sponsors to have at least 
one manufacturer lined up for the product.
432
 This is particularly relevant to the tropical disease 
program, in order to address the “last mile” problem (i.e. where problems are frequently faced in 
low-income countries with transportation, organization, and lack of qualified personnel involved 
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with administering treatments),
433
 although it would do nothing to address the affordability 
concerns in any event. Others suggest that the eligibility criteria should include some guarantee 
from the sponsor that the drugs for which vouchers are awarded will be made available at 
affordable prices.
434
 Notwithstanding how unpopular these suggestions are likely to be with the 
pharmaceutical industry, they would serve to further promote the objective of increasing patient 
access to treatment. That being said, putting limits on what a company could charge for their 
eligible product would in all likelihood significantly impair the effectiveness of voucher 
programs. 
 Alternatively, it may be inappropriate to address the access issue by amending the 
voucher programs. In reality the point of the voucher programs is to address the market failures 
that lead to diseases being neglected, and to do so specifically by increasing the expected rate of 
return on R&D investments. As discussed above, companies have historically neglected to 
develop treatments for tropical diseases and rare pediatric disorders because these are not 
typically expected to be profitable markets; further limiting what a company can expect to 
receive would increase the financial disincentive, which is the exact opposite of what the 
voucher programs are trying to do. 
 The issue of affordable access is not suited to being addressed via a “revenue-side” 
incentive such as voucher programs. It may simply be the case that these types of financial 
incentives are generally not the best means for promoting affordable access to treatments.
435
 
Innovation and access to innovative products are two distinct issues, and the creators of the 
voucher program note that it encourages innovation and acknowledge that the program does not 
necessarily promote access.
436
 Pharmaceutical innovation for neglected diseases is a socially 
valuable goal in and of itself because without the development of urgently needed products there 
can be no access to such drugs. Amending the eligibility criteria so as to require that companies 
guarantee affordable access would likely severely undermine the value of vouchers and the 
program’s effectiveness. Other mechanisms for ensuring affordable access, such as tax credits 
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that would lower the costs of development or direct grants for drug development that are 
contingent upon reasonable prices, may be more appropriate means of addressing the access 
issue.  
5.4  Effectiveness and Impact of the Voucher Programs 
 As discussed above,
437
 it is inherently difficult to determine the effectiveness and impact 
of a sole incentive on decisions about drug development because such decisions are naturally 
going to be influenced by any number of factors. Perhaps taking a cue from concerns about the 
lack of formal evaluation of other pharmaceutical incentives, some attempt has been made to 
formally analyze the effectiveness of the voucher programs.
438
 In accordance with the original 
enactment of the RPD voucher program, a GAO assessment was completed, details of which are 
discussed below. The recently enacted 21
st
 Century Cures Act further requires that, by January 
31, 2020, the GAO conduct and submit a study of all three voucher programs and, among other 
issues, specifically assess “whether any improvements to such programs are necessary to 
appropriately target incentives for the development of drugs that would likely not otherwise be 
developed, or developed in as timely a manner.”439 As such, while the Act may not address the 
concerns and perceived problems with vouchers, at least it does create “a better normative 
framework for evaluating the successes and failures of the program as an incentives 
mechanism.”440 
  The initial GAO report on the effectiveness of the RPD voucher program was published 
in March, 2016. Mirroring the academic literature on the subject, the general consensus about the 
RPD voucher is that, given how long drug development takes, it is too early to tell whether or not 
the program provides an effective incentive.
441
 Drug development typically takes over a decade 
to complete and, therefore, it is unsurprising that every drug for which a voucher has been 
awarded was already in the process of being developed when the voucher program was 
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implemented.
442
 However, requests for vouchers, and for RPD designation, may be indicative of 
interest in the program.
443
 One study considers that the 52 requests for RPD designation (as of 
December 2015) are demonstrative of “considerable enthusiasm for the PRV program.”444 As 
such, there may be some indication that voucher programs are “on track” to encouraging the 
targeted drug development.
 445
 Nevertheless, more time and information is needed to really 
understand the impact that these programs are having on public health outcomes. 
5.4.1  Voucher Programs May Not Effectively Encourage Valuable Innovation 
 A couple of distinct lines of criticism about voucher programs have been raised in the 
literature regarding what constitutes a qualifying drug. These concerns ultimately relate to what 
is and is not required by the eligibility criteria. The first concern is that vouchers can provide 
developers with a windfall because they are awarded for getting a drug approved in the United 
States, regardless of the time and money (or lack thereof) that a company actually invested in 
developing the drug. The second concern is that the eligibility criteria do not sufficiently 
promote valuable drug innovation. This section assesses each of these issues in turn.  
5.4.1.1  Windfall Potential of Vouchers 
 Vouchers, as with market exclusivity regimes, are intended to address a market failure, 
not to provide companies with a sort of windfall. A frequent complaint is that voucher programs 
allow companies to receive potentially significant financial gain without having had to do any of 
the legwork or otherwise provide any additional amount of investment to develop a qualifying 
drug. The eligibility criteria require that a drug has not been previously approved in the United 
States,
446
 but there are no conditions regarding drugs that have been already approved and used 
in other jurisdictions. A company can, therefore, obtain a voucher, and the associated profits, by 
simply registering a qualifying drug with the FDA, a practice alleged to be one which 
“pointlessly rewards old innovation.”447 Clearly this can and has happened. In March 2014, 
Knight Therapeutics was awarded a voucher for miltefosine, a leishmaniasis treatment, but 
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miltefosine had already been approved and widely used in other countries for that indication.
448
 
Knight is reported to have spent roughly $10 million to purchase the rights to the drug and obtain 
FDA approval; as a result of these “efforts” the company was subsequently able to sell its 
voucher for $125 million.
449
 In this instance the voucher program was “effective” only to the 
extent that it encouraged Knight to seek market approval in the United States for a drug. 
Obtaining market approval for miltefosine in the United States likely had little effect, if any, on 
access to a necessary treatment because patients needing leishmaniasis drugs are typically not in 
the United States.
450
  This narrative is used as one example of how the program “is subsidizing 
the non-negligible, yet modest costs (by pharmaceutical industry standards) of bringing existing 
drugs into the United States market.”451 The Knight example offers clear evidence that voucher 
programs can be used by pharmaceutical companies to obtain windfall profits without producing 
any significant benefit. 
 Knight Therapeutics is not the only company to benefit from the voucher program in this 
manner. The first voucher under the Tropical Disease program went to Novartis in 2009 for a 
malaria treatment that had already been approved in over 80 countries.
452
 United Therapeutics 
was awarded a RPD voucher for a drug that was largely developed by the National Cancer 
Institute; the company sold this voucher in 2015 for $350 million.
453
 The CEO of one drug 
company who initially stood to be a potential recipient of a tropical disease voucher noted that 
within his company the voucher was referred to as the “Willy Wonka ticket” because it was 
regarded as an unexpected bonus of their drug development activities.
454
 Furthermore, Ebola and 
Zika viruses have recently been added to the list of qualifying tropical diseases, but only after a 
number of development activities were commenced for these diseases.
455
 These examples 
suggest that voucher programs may simply be providing a reward for treatments that would have 
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been developed regardless, such that “all resulting biopharmaceutical innovation [is] completely 
detached from this type of incentive program”.456  
 Some argue that the legislation should be fixed in order to prevent companies from 
obtaining windfalls.
457
 A common recommendation is to amend the legislation to require that 
companies show that they have invested some minimum amount in R&D for an eligible product 
in order to qualify for a voucher.
458
 Alternatively, a two-year window of eligibility could be 
imposed on drugs that have already been approved in other jurisdictions.
459
 It is notable that 
these two suggestions address “windfalls” occurring where the value of the voucher exceeds 
costs of drug approval; they do not address situations where the drug approval would have 
occurred even if the voucher program were not available, (i.e., the “Willy Wonka ticket” 
scenario). As of now, it is unclear how great of a problem this potential for windfalls truly is. 
With respect to vouchers, it may simply be a matter of giving the program time and it has been 
noted that in any event these examples should diminish as the programs continue because 
obvious sources of these types of drugs will “dry up”.460 To reiterate, it is hardly surprising that 
vouchers have thus far been awarded for treatments that were already developed or being 
developed before the voucher programs were implemented. Over time, more information will be 
made available that will help determine whether or not the voucher programs are effective at 
encouraging innovative drug development.  
5.4.1.2 Disconnection between the Value of Eligible Drugs and the Reward of a Voucher  
 A second, and perhaps more significant, concern about the eligibility criteria is that they 
fail to connect the size of the reward (the voucher) with the value or utility of the drug for which 
a voucher is awarded.
461
 With respect to the tropical disease voucher, the program may be 
unlikely to encourage the development of cures (e.g. vaccines) over symptomatic relief because 
eligibility is not linked with the effectiveness of the qualifying drug.
462
 On the other hand, drugs 
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must be eligible for priority review on their own merits in order to qualify for a voucher;
463
 
therefore there is arguably some degree of assurance that they meet an unmet need. However, 
this only partially addresses the issue. The threshold for priority review designation is not 
necessarily that high. One review of drugs submitted between 1987 and 2014 indicates that 
priority review status is increasingly being granted for drugs that are not first in class; in other 
words, some drugs that are not necessarily that innovative are already being deemed eligible for 
priority review.
464
  Therefore, the FDA may not be currently using the priority review program to 
give priority solely to drugs which are the most innovative, indicating that the impact of 
vouchers will not be as detrimental to their operations as the agency has suggested. At the same 
time, this means that the requirement that a drug be eligible for priority review is likely to be of 
relatively little consequence.  
 Furthermore, the voucher programs do not encourage companies to make valuable 
improvements to existing treatments because in order to be eligible for a voucher a drug must not 
contain a previously approved active ingredient (including an ester or salt of a previously 
approved active ingredient).
465
  Restricting the eligibility criteria in this manner might needlessly 
discourage the development of valuable innovation that takes advantage of previously approved 
active ingredients. This requirement may prevent a lot of valuable drugs from being encouraged 
by voucher programs, particularly given that, for example, the best new treatments for malaria 
and tuberculosis often contain previously approved active ingredients.
466
 Changes made to 
“known” ingredients can actually be of significant benefit to patients, but would be ineligible for 
a voucher.
467
 As a result, for example, a new malaria treatment that is effective but must be 
administered six times a day and degrades in the heat would be eligible for a voucher but an 
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improved formula of that same drug that would greatly enhance its usefulness in lower income 
countries would not be rewarded.
468
  
 Finally, the eligibility criterion for the RPD program states that qualifying NDAs must 
“not seek approval for an adult indication in the original rare pediatric disease product 
application”.469 While the FDA guidance makes it clear that they interpret this to mean that 
applications seeking approval as a treatment for a RPD and as a treatment for adults with the 
same disease will not be ineligible,
470
 it unclear why the legislation should dissuade sponsors 
from seeking approval as a treatment for a different adult indication at the same time. This 
nuance of the policy could needlessly delay the approval of treatments for different adult 
indications and further disconnects the reward from public health benefits.
471
  
 To more closely link the reward of a voucher with a positive impact on public health, 
some have suggested that the eligibility criteria require some evidence that the drug is likely to 
have a therapeutic advantage over existing treatments
472
 or that the award of a voucher be 
contingent on a demonstration of a plan to make the eligible drug available at affordable 
prices.
473
 Neither of these suggestions is likely to gain popularity with the pharmaceutical 
industry, nor is adding such requirements likely to encourage companies to make risky 
investments under even less certainty that they will receive a voucher. It is also unclear how 
feasible this requirement would be to implement and administer because of difficulties with 
designing and applying such criteria in a fair and predictable manner. While it is likely important 
to dissuade companies from making minor or otherwise meaningless alterations to existing 
treatments solely in order to obtain a voucher, relaxing the restrictions about known active 
ingredients could serve to encourage valuable improvements to previously approved drugs and, 
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therefore, strengthen the connection between the reward of a voucher and the value of the 
qualifying drug. 
5.4.2  Vouchers May be an Ineffective Incentive for Pharmaceutical Innovation 
 Despite the political popularity of voucher programs, there is room to question whether 
vouchers can actually encourage the targeted drug development. In some ways, much of this 
scepticism stems from the novelty of vouchers as an incentive and the resulting uncertainty about 
how the voucher programs will be administered. Additionally, some argue that the value of a 
voucher will never be sufficient to influence R&D decisions given the costs of drug 
development.
474
 There are reasons to question how great of an impact vouchers can have (i.e. 
estimations of potential voucher prices are very small relative to the cost of drug development) 
but there are reports from the pharmaceutical industry indicating that at least some drug 
companies are using the voucher program as a means to attract additional investment.
475
 This 
section discusses the potential impact that vouchers are likely to have on drug development 
decisions in further detail.  
5.4.2.1  Uncertainty about how the Voucher Programs will be Administered  
 To begin, there is uncertainty surrounding the voucher programs in general which may 
inhibit their effectiveness. Drug companies may not be strongly influenced by vouchers because 
the program is so novel and unique. Uncertainty about how the programs would work and how 
the FDA would interpret the criteria likely has impaired the effectiveness of the programs, 
particularly when the tropical disease voucher program was first introduced.
476
 Adding to the 
uncertainty is the fact that vouchers only reward successful development efforts. Drug 
development is an inherently uncertain process, with many drugs and potential treatments never 
showing sufficiently positive clinical results. As a “pull” mechanism, vouchers are a reward for 
research output or, more specifically, for successful research output. It is difficult to predict years 
in advance whether a drug will eventually obtain FDA approval and therefore be eligible for a 
voucher. As such, vouchers are unlikely to be an effective incentive in the early decision-making 
stages.  
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 However, uncertainty about receiving a voucher does not mean that the program cannot 
still encourage companies to continue with or re-direct a project toward developing an eligible 
drug. For example, vouchers could provide the necessary encouragement that will ensure a 
company sees a project fully through to completion.  There is some suggestion that companies 
are using the potential to receive a voucher in exactly this manner.
477
 For example, one non-
profit organization reports having used the voucher program to attract the additional investment 
it needed to complete the clinical trials and registration of a drug that “had been languishing for 
years”.478 Furthermore, a company can apply in advance to have their drug designated as a RPD 
treatment,
479
 an aspect of the program that can provide some degree of certainty about whether a 
drug will eventually be eligible for a voucher.
480
 The uncertainty about obtaining a voucher 
likely does inhibit any impact that the incentive will have on early decision-making but vouchers 
can nevertheless still be an effective tool to encourage companies to see projects fully through 
the development pipeline.
481
  
 The original enactment of the RPD program contained a sunset clause that likely 
contributed to the uncertainty about obtaining a voucher. The GAO report describes how at least 
two drug sponsors have reported a hesitation to invest years and money to develop a qualifying 
drug because they could not be sure that the program would still exist by the time the 
development process could be completed.
482
 Until the 21
st
 Century Cures Act was enacted in 
December of 2016, the RPD was set to terminate in 2016.
483
 The Act amends section 529 of the 
Food, Drug, & Cosmetics Act and provides for the RPD program to continue until September 
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2020.
484
 While the 21
st
 Century Cures Act does provide an additional two years during which 
time vouchers can be awarded for treatments that were designated as RPD drugs prior to 
September 2020,
485
 any potential effectiveness of the vouchers is likely impaired by this clause 
because drug companies are understandably unlikely to be encouraged by a program that may 
terminate before they can complete the drug development process and therefore be eligible for 
the reward.
486
  
 Uncertainty about the continuation of the RPD voucher program and any resulting 
decreased effectiveness of the incentive should be accepted as a reasonable price to pay given 
that there are legitimate questions and concerns about voucher programs, as outlined above. The 
benefits to be gained from a formal assessment of the impact and effect of all three voucher 
programs, as required by the 21
st
 Century Cures Act,
487
 outweigh the disadvantages that may be 
incurred because of the sunset clause. As discussed above, voucher programs may interfere with 
the FDA’s ability to prioritize urgently needed treatments and have raised some reservations 
about the safety of blockbuster drugs that are granted priority review. The merits of these 
concerns should be formally assessed before the voucher programs are allowed to continue 
indefinitely. The additional two years granted to companies who receive RPD designation for 
their drug will help to mitigate this uncertainty and much of the related impairment of the 
program’s effectiveness.  
5.4.2.2  Uncertainty about the Value of Vouchers 
 Even if a company could be certain they would receive a voucher for their development 
efforts, it would nevertheless be difficult, if not impossible, for them to accurately predict how 
valuable their voucher would be to them. The value of a voucher can be realized in one of two 
ways: a company can use the voucher itself to get a drug of its own on the market more quickly, 
or it can sell the voucher to another company.  It has been suggested that voucher programs will 
be more influential for companies that also have a potential blockbuster drug in development, 
because the value of using a voucher to accelerate their own drug to market will typically be 
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greater than what they would gain by selling the voucher.
488
 Getting a blockbuster drug to market 
even four months quicker can be significantly profitable for a company. As discussed above,   
Sanofi-Aventis’s cholesterol treatment, for which it redeemed a voucher, is expected to bring in 
$2 billion annually.
489
 Accelerating that drug to market resulted in the company obtaining 
significantly greater profit. In this instance, the voucher also enabled Sanofi-Aventis to get its 
drug on the market ahead of a competitor,
490
 which can have additional advantages for a 
company as well.
491
 Therefore, redeeming a voucher has been shown to result in some additional 
financial gain for drug developers, at least for companies that have additional drugs in the 
development pipeline.  
 However, it is primarily small companies that are doing research on rare and neglected 
diseases; these companies are far less likely to have potential blockbuster drugs also in 
development and, therefore, are less likely to benefit from a voucher.
492
 If a company cannot take 
advantage of a voucher itself, any value must come from a sale of the voucher, which is 
problematic because it relies on negotiations between private bodies.
493
 The resulting lack of 
transparency between a seller and a potential buyer can reduce the price that a developer of a 
qualifying drug can expect to receive from selling a voucher.
494
 The market value of a voucher is 
inherently uncertain. The value of vouchers is dependent on how much it is worth to a drug 
developer to have their drug subject to priority review (i.e. a voucher is going to be worth a lot 
more to developers that have a promising blockbuster drug in development), which is not 
necessarily going to be fully understood.
495
 A number of attempts have been made to estimate 
the commercial value of a voucher, and previous voucher sales can help to inform this estimate, 
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but it remains fairly speculative.
496
 The difficulty of estimating the value of a voucher has been 
cited by pharmaceutical companies as limiting how influential the incentive is.
497
 The reality is 
that the value of a voucher depends on what a company is willing to pay at the time a company is 
looking to sell (which is dependent on many other factors such as the potential buyer’s 
confidence in their drug that they are considering using a voucher for and the number of 
vouchers available at the time). Therefore, vouchers are a reward of a very uncertain and highly 
speculative value, an aspect of the program that surely impairs its effectiveness.  
 As the value of a voucher cannot be known ahead of time (particularly for companies that 
will have to sell a voucher in order to realize its value), it is reasonable to question how effective 
of an incentive vouchers ever could be. The value of market exclusivity is more certain; at the 
very least companies will know how long the period of protection will last, and will have a rough 
estimate of the market demand for a particular orphan drug.
498
 Not much can be done to address 
the uncertainty about the “size” of the reward, except to keep one thing in mind: the value of 
vouchers will decrease if the number of vouchers available for sale is increased. In this sense, the 
effectiveness of the PRV programs creates a paradox: the more successful they are at 
encouraging drug development, the more vouchers will be awarded. More vouchers available for 
sale will reduce the market value of a voucher and, therefore, the effectiveness of the 
incentive.
499
 This needs to be borne in mind when policymakers start to consider possible 
expansions to the voucher programs.
500
 Proposals to expand the voucher program into other 
disease areas likely create further uncertainty about the value of vouchers, and expansions would 
reduce the price that companies could expect to get for a voucher by flooding the market.
501
 In 
order to ensure that the value of a voucher remains relatively high, policy makers should be 
hesitant to make expansions and seek to keep the eligibility criteria for awarding vouchers fairly 
narrow.
502
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5.4.2.3 (In)Sufficient Value of Vouchers  
 Critics of PRVs also assert that vouchers are not and never will be sufficiently valuable to 
encourage companies to invest in R&D for rare diseases because of how expensive the drug 
development process is.
503
 Even though the selling price for a voucher has gone as high as $350 
million, this price is unlikely to be sufficient to encourage large drug companies to alter their 
investment strategy to include tropical or rare pediatric diseases.
504
 To illustrate, it costs roughly 
$1 billion to develop a vaccine; a voucher of unknown value is not a sufficiently strong incentive 
to encourage investment in vaccine development.
505
 At least one author has suggested that, in 
order to alleviate this concern, developers of qualifying drugs should receive three vouchers 
instead of just one.
506
 However, this would likely introduce too many vouchers and drive down 
the market value and, accordingly, the effectiveness of vouchers. Vouchers may simply be “too 
small” of an incentive to influence behaviour and, therefore, as discussed above, vouchers may 
only be rewarding behaviour that would have occurred in any event.  
 Undoubtedly the value of PRVs alone is insufficient to trigger an orphan drug 
development project; however, this does not lead to the conclusion that vouchers are altogether 
insufficiently valuable to have an impact on behaviour. The creators of the voucher programs 
acknowledge that vouchers alone are unlikely to be a sufficiently large financial incentive but 
nevertheless defend their utility, arguing that vouchers were never intended to operate as a stand-
alone incentive.
507
 It was always anticipated that vouchers would work in conjunction with other 
push and pull mechanisms such as the Orphan Drug Tax Credit, research grants, and market 
exclusivity, as evidenced by the original proposal in which the authors take into account the tax 
credit available to orphan drug developers in their estimate of the potential value of a PRV.
508
 It 
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is nevertheless possible that vouchers do play a valuable role in innovation policy by 
encouraging drug sponsors to see the development process through to completion. While 
acknowledging the importance of funding basic science and providing other incentives, Ridley 
and colleagues nevertheless continue to support the utility of vouchers as a means of getting 
products fully through the development pipeline.
509
 In addition, voucher programs can encourage 
drug developers to “salvage existing projects that were initiated for other diseases”510 or 
otherwise operate to “motivate developers to continue with existing programs”.511 In this 
manner, vouchers will function as the necessary “nudge” to get a company to apply for FDA 
approval for a targeted drug by offering a way for companies to attract the investment needed for 
late-stage trials in circumstances where the commercial potential of neglected diseases is too 
small, making it difficult to get the necessary additional investment.
512
  
 Some reports from the pharmaceutical industry indicate that vouchers are in fact currently 
being used as part of a business strategy. The CEO of Kineta, a company that has investments in 
drugs for dengue and Ebola, has stated that the tropical disease voucher program has been 
“critical in making the business case to our investors to advance this research”.513  Additionally, 
the CEO of a Vancouver-based company has also reported that the possibility of receiving a 
voucher has been useful in attracting potential buyers or partners for the company.
514
 In this 
example, the company had already started to develop a treatment for leishmaniasis prior to the 
implementation of PRVs but are now using the program to attract necessary additional 
investment.
515
 Surveys and follow-up interviews with drug companies involved in developing 
treatments for tropical diseases indicate that PRVs are a major consideration for investment 
decisions, though other factors play a greater role in influencing their decisions.
516
 Finally, the 
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responses do indicate that vouchers alone are not sufficient to encourage the desired drug 
development, a finding that echoes the original proposal for the voucher incentive: that vouchers 
need to be paired with other incentives in order to be useful.
517
 This may be evidence that, in 
spite of their limitations, vouchers are nevertheless “a valuable and highly cost-effective 
addition” to pharmaceutical incentive schemes.518  
 The 21
st
 Century Cures Act requires that the GAO determine “whether, and to what 
extent, the voucher impacted the sponsor’s decision to develop [a] drug.”519 Therefore, this 
report can be expected to shed further light on the effectiveness of the voucher programs.  The 
impact of vouchers on R&D decisions must be weighed against the potential policy issues 
discussed above; the GAO is mandated to evaluate these as well. In the interim, a relatively small 
impact on decision-making (that is suggested by these early surveys) does not warrant 
prematurely abandoning the incentive. Provided that the risks and costs associated with vouchers 
do not outweigh any benefits then the program may be worthwhile even though it may not create 
a sufficiently large incentive to operate independently as a catalyst for drug development. 
5.5  Potential for a Canadian PRV program 
  Generally speaking, as the costs and impact of vouchers in the United States have yet to 
be adequately determined, other jurisdictions should be hesitant to introduce similar programs. 
Furthermore, the administrative burden created by voucher redemptions is likely to be 
exaggerated in Canada because Health Canada is a smaller agency than the FDA, and the already 
small impact of vouchers can be expected to be further impaired by the significantly smaller 
pharmaceutical market here.  
 As in the United States, Health Canada has a priority review mechanism in place. Priority 
review is limited to drugs that are “intended for the treatment, prevention or diagnosis of serious, 
life-threatening or severely debilitating illnesses or conditions where a) there is no existing drug 
on the Canadian market with the same profile or b) where the new product represents a 
significant improvement in the benefit/risk profile over existing products.”520 Priority review 
status means that Health Canada will approach a drug submission with a shortened review target 
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in mind, one of 180 days instead of the standard 300 days.
521
 The agency strives to meet this 
accelerated target by inserting these applications into the queue with this review target in mind 
(i.e. by reviewing it in advance of other, non-priority drug submissions).
522
  
 Unfortunately, there is relatively little literature about Health Canada’s priority review 
system, and therefore any conclusions will have to be extrapolated from what information is 
available.  The timeliness of the review of new drugs in Canada has long been criticized, with 
Canada historically lagging well behind the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
Australia.
523
 An Auditor General report of Health Canada’s review performance in 2009 and 
2010 found that only 70% of new drug submissions (“NDS”) were reviewed within the targeted 
300 days, a figure significantly short of Health Canada’s target of completing 90% of reviews 
within the targeted timeframe.
524
 A number of factors were offered in explanation of this, 
including the various duties that reviewers must undertake in addition to their review duties.
525
 
Health Canada implemented a cost recovery framework in April 2011 that included increased 
user fees and was intended to improve review times.
526
 Nevertheless, two more recently 
published articles investigated the timeliness of cancer-treating drug reviews across jurisdictions 
and found that Health Canada still takes significantly longer than the FDA to review drug 
submissions.
527
 However these articles only considered drugs that were approved up to June 
2013, and marketing applications for cancer-treating drugs may be particularly large and 
complex.
528
 The most recent performance report from the Therapeutic Products Directorate is 
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more illuminating. The report shows that, on average, Health Canada did not meet its review 
target of 300 days for standard review during the fiscal years 2011 up to 2015-2016.
529
 With 
approval times ranging from a maximum of 1119 calendar days in fiscal year 2011-12 to a 
minimum of 63 calendar days in 2012-13 this average is not necessarily an accurate 
representation of Health Canada’s performance.530 Of greater significance is Health Canada’s 
performance with respect to priority review of NDSs. No NDS given priority status during the 
time-period was reviewed within the targeted 180 days.
531
 This data is particularly relevant to a 
consideration of the PRV program because it suggests that, as Health Canada currently does not 
meet its targeted timeframe for reviewing “priority” drug applications, PRVs therefore would 
likely introduce an additional burden that could not be met by the agency. Nor could PRVs be an 
effective incentive if companies could not rely on Health Canada being able to complete an 
accelerated review in a sufficiently timely manner.  
 Furthermore, safety issues with drugs that receive priority review may be a legitimate 
concern in the Canadian context. One study found that drugs approved via Health Canada’s 
priority review system between 1995 and 2010 are significantly more likely to subsequently have 
a serious safety issue than drugs that were approved via standard review during the same 
timeframe.
532
 Unfortunately, this investigation defines “serious safety issue” to mean either the 
acquisition of a serious safety warning or the withdrawal from the market for safety reasons.
533
 
As discussed above, subsequent acquisition of a safety warning may simply be a consequence of 
a different risk-benefit consideration that may be appropriate for drugs that merit priority review, 
rather than evidence of any deficiencies in the priority review process itself. Of greater concern 
are drugs that are approved via priority review then subsequently withdrawn for safety reasons.  
Of the 84 products that experienced a “serious safety issue” after approval, only 16 were 
ultimately withdrawn from the market and it is unclear how many of these were subject to 
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standard or priority review.
534
 Therefore, there is not enough information to conclude whether or 
not the additional burden of vouchers could be imposed on the agency without incurring further 
delays and potential problems with the safety of vouchered drugs. 
 Even if Health Canada is adequately prepared to take on the additional workload, the 
benefits to drug developers of a priority review voucher, and therefore the effectiveness of the 
incentive, are likely to be far less in the Canadian context because of the significantly smaller 
market for pharmaceutical products. In general, companies are choosing to not market products 
in Canada, possibly because “[a] small Canadian market and/or limitations on introductory prices 
imposed by the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board may mean that expected sales are too 
low to warrant the costs of getting a drug approved and then promoting it in Canada.”535 If 
companies currently cannot be bothered to market their product in Canada, it is reasonable to 
expect that a potential priority review in Canada is going to be of very little value to a drug 
sponsor. Given that the effectiveness of the program in the United States, particularly in relation 
to the costs and risks of vouchers, has yet to be determined, it is unlikely to be worthwhile to 
introduce a voucher program in Canada at this time.   
5.6 Summary 
 The above evaluation of how the voucher programs are functioning in the United States 
leads to the conclusion that, to echo the GAO report, it is too early to say with confidence 
whether or not vouchers are an effective and efficient incentive for drug development. While the 
vouchers may be small and uncertain in value relative to market exclusivity, they may 
nevertheless be a worthwhile supplement to other incentives, particularly when one considers 
how they have been drafted so as to more specifically target subsets of orphan diseases that are 
especially likely to be neglected (i.e. tropical and pediatric diseases).
536
 If the policy concerns 
(i.e. drug safety and FDA workload) are determined to be unfounded then the program may be 
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justified even though it has only a relatively small impact on decision-making and investment in 
rare diseases. A relatively small impact is acceptable from a policy perspective provided that the 
benefits of the incentive outweigh the disadvantages. The same considerations would apply to a 
voucher program in Canada, though the costs-benefit analysis would change because Canada’s 
pharmaceutical market is significantly smaller. Questions about the value of a priority review 
voucher and concerns about the burden placed on the review agency are likely exaggerated in the 
Canadian context. Overall, a PRV program in Canada cannot be recommended because it is 
likely to create too much additional workload for Health Canada and, in any event, accelerating 
drugs to the Canadian market is not particularly valuable to companies with the result that PRVs 
would not be an effective incentive in Canada. While it is possible that the program may become 
a good policy choice in the future (if further study of the United States PRV programs show 
stronger and more convincing results), Canada’s smaller pharmaceutical market means that any 
advantage to be gained from priority review is also going to be smaller. 
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CHAPTER 6: INCENTIVE OPTION 3 – TAX CREDIT FOR DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
6.1  The Nature of Tax-based Incentives 
 Market exclusivity and PRVs are examples of “pull”, or “revenue-side”, incentives 
because they reward the ultimate product of R&D projects; both are designed to increase a 
drug’s profitability through increasing revenues (as opposed to decreasing costs). The tax system 
offers an alternative means of providing an incentive for orphan drug development. Referred to 
in the literature as “push” (also called “supply-side”) mechanisms, tax-based incentives for 
innovation operate by lowering the costs of doing R&D. This has important implications for both 
policymakers and the pharmaceutical industry, including the timing of the incentive and the 
targeted behaviour. Tax incentives are available throughout the drug development process and 
are not dependent upon ultimately getting a drug approved for market. Therefore, unlike market 
exclusivity and PRVs, tax-based incentives specifically facilitate the actual process of drug 
development rather than “simply” encouraging companies to get regulatory approval for an 
orphan drug.  
 This Chapter assesses the use of the tax system to encourage orphan drug development 
activity in Canada. Section 6.2 describes the justification for government subsidization of R&D 
in general, either via tax expenditures or through direct funding programs. Canada’s general 
R&D tax incentive, the Scientific Research and Experimental Development (“SR&ED”) 
program, is described, followed by a description of the Orphan Drug Tax Credit (“ODTC”), 
which is an orphan drug-specific incentive available in the United States. Section 6.3 discusses 
the issues associated with using the tax system to provide an incentive for R&D. Notably, using 
the tax system generally has consequences for the amount of government oversight that will be 
given to a program. Tax-based incentives also offer taxpayers a degree of certainty that is not 
available with market exclusivity and PRVs because drug developers will obtain a tax credit 
regardless of whether their R&D activities ultimately yield a marketable product. This section 
concludes with Section 6.4, which provides a summary of the findings and recommendations 
arrived at through the analysis of tax incentives for orphan drug development. Specifically, a tax-
based incentive would be a valuable orphan drug incentive in Canada that would promote the 
interests of rare disease patients without placing undue financial strain on taxpayers.   
95 
 
6.2  Tax Incentives for Innovation 
 Policymakers frequently use tax expenditures to promote socially desirable behaviour, 
including innovation.
537
 Tax-based incentives for innovation can be designed in a number of 
different ways, including deductions, exclusions, exemptions, credits (refundable and non-
refundable), deferrals, and lower tax rates.
538
 The financial benefit for taxpayers is in the form of 
reduced tax liability, which in turn is a cost to governments (and, by extension, other taxpayers) 
in the form of forgone government revenue.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, market failures are frequently cited as providing a strong 
rationale for governments to provide incentives that will encourage socially valuable 
behaviour.
539
 It is uncertain whether or not tax expenditures are the best way to effect behaviour 
changes,
540
 and it can be difficult to assess the effectiveness of tax expenditures that are intended 
to modify behaviour.
541
 Many economic and political variables are going to influence a 
company’s ability and willingness to undertake R&D projects.542 As a result, it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which tax benefits actually encourage increased R&D activity as opposed 
to merely providing financial support for R&D projects that would have been undertaken in the 
absence of the incentive. However, the extent to which a business is willing to undertake R&D 
activities is certainly going to be influenced by the costs of doing so.
543
 Therefore, government 
programs that reduce a company’s costs of doing R&D are likely to facilitate greater innovative 
activity by that business,
544
 and empirical evidence generally indicates that government subsidies 
for R&D, either via direct funding programs or through the tax system, “are an effective means 
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of encouraging innovative activity.”545 The following discussion describes how tax expenditures 
are being used to promote R&D and attempts to evaluate whether the benefits of using the tax 
system outweigh the costs of doing so.  
6.2.1  Scientific Research & Experimental Development 
 Canada already uses its tax system to subsidize R&D activity in general via SR&ED, a 
federal tax program that is meant to encourage innovative activity.
546
 The scope of SR&ED is 
very broad; eligibility is not limited to any particular industry and the R&D activities that qualify 
for the tax benefits include everything from basic research (that which seeks to advance scientific 
knowledge without reference to a specific practical application) up to experimental development 
(activities that are intended to produce technological achievement).
547
 As such, SR&ED is not 
specifically designed to encourage the pharmaceutical industry to invest in R&D for orphan 
diseases.  
 Three forms of tax benefits are available via SR&ED: an income tax deduction,
548
 an 
investment tax credit (“ITC”),549 and, for small Canadian‑controlled private corporations 
(“CCPCs”), a refundable ITC.550 The SR&ED ITC can be claimed by a corporation, partnership, 
individual for all qualifying R&D costs for eligible activities carried on in Canada.
551
 Eligible 
research activities are defined in subsection 248(1) of the Income Tax Act.
552
 It should be noted 
that the SR&ED ITC is a comprehensive credit, meaning that the credit can be claimed for 
almost all R&D spending.
553
 Comprehensive credit schemes operate differently from incremental 
credit schemes, whereby a credit rate is applied only to the amount of R&D expenses that 
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exceeds a “base amount”.554 Many other jurisdictions, including the United States, use 
incremental credit schemes to provide R&D tax benefits.
555
 
 SR&ED is the “single largest federal program” to provide financial support for 
commercial R&D in Canada, with the program providing “more than $3 billion in tax incentives 
to over 20,000 claimants annually.”556 An Independent Panel report on government R&D 
spending, mandated by the Minister of State (Science and Technology), noted that SR&ED 
accounts for 70% of federal government spending to facilitate R&D.
557
 The projected cost of the 
SR&ED credit for 2018 is $2,905 million.
558
 SR&ED is perceived to be overly expensive, as 
evidenced by recommendations that changes be made to the provisions in order to reduce the 
cost of the program.
559
 Some relatively recent changes have in fact been made, including a 
reduction of the credit rate from 20% to 15% and exclusion of capital expenditures and lease 
payments from being eligible for a deduction,
560
 presumably with the intention to cut back on 
SR&ED spending. 
 A report by an Independent Panel was commissioned in response to concerns about low 
rates of business innovation in Canada relative to other countries.
561
 The Panel found that 
Canada does indeed lag behind other countries with respect to the rate of innovation and that, 
compared with other countries, Canada relies very heavily on SR&ED to subsidize R&D activity 
as opposed to direct funding schemes.
562
 It is possible that these two findings are related, in other 
words, that SR&ED is not as effective as it could be and that the level of innovation in Canada 
suffers as a result. One study found that firms who took advantage of both innovation tax credits 
and an R&D grant program “not only introduced more innovations but made more world-first 
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innovations and were more successful in commercializing their innovations,”563 indicating that 
innovative activities may be more effectively encouraged when both tax credits and grants are 
used compared to the use of only a tax incentive. This finding is mirrored by the Independent 
Panel’s recommendation that SR&ED spending be reduced in favour of more direct spending.564 
It is, therefore, open to suggest that Canada’s reliance on the SR&ED program at the expense of 
decreased resources being available for direct spending programs at least contributes to Canada’s 
perceived lack of innovation.
565
 
 Several issues with the SR&ED program have been cited as impairing its effectiveness. 
As with other tax expenditures, SR&ED appears to be prone to uneven distributional effects, or 
in other words, creating an upside down effect whereby larger and more established companies 
benefit more from the program than smaller or newer publically traded companies that are not 
eligible for refundable credits.
566
 SR&ED’s eligibility provisions have also been noted as being 
overly complex, perhaps further contributing to an upside-down effect by making it more 
difficult for less sophisticated, but potentially very innovative, companies to identify eligible 
expenditures.
567
 There is empirical evidence indicating that smaller companies are in fact 
generally less able to benefit from R&D tax incentives precisely for this reason.
568
 This uneven 
distributional effect seems to be the combined result of a lack of awareness of the potential tax 
benefits,
569
 the complex eligibility criteria (which make it difficult for businesses to accurately 
estimate their eligibility), and the high costs of claiming (i.e. sufficient record-keeping).
570
 The 
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report of the Independent Panel suggests that SR&ED could be made more effective, particularly 
for small and medium-sized corporations, if the eligibility provisions were simplified.
571
 
Specifically, making certain expenditures ineligible was recommended in order to reduce the 
compliance costs associated with identifying eligible expenditures and maintaining the 
documentation necessary to claim the benefit.
572
  
 While available to the pharmaceutical industry,
573
 SR&ED does not encourage orphan 
drug development specifically. Given that availability of approved treatments for rare diseases is 
still very much an issue, SR&ED is likely insufficient as a means of encouraging orphan drug 
development in Canada. The initial draft discussion document for a Canadian orphan drug policy 
does not contemplate using the tax system to provide an orphan drug-specific incentive, possibly 
because the SR&ED program is already available. Nevertheless, the United States has a tax 
credit specifically for orphan drug development in addition to a general research tax credit. If 
Canada were to introduce an orphan drug framework, SR&ED would undoubtedly be used by 
companies that invest in orphan drugs. However, the subsidization provided by SR&ED may not 
be sufficient, and a tax credit that specifically encourages orphan drug development could be a 
valuable and effective incentive.  
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6.2.2 The Orphan Drug Tax Credit 
 In addition to a general R&D tax benefit and direct research grants, the United States also 
uses its tax system to specifically promote orphan drug development. Implemented as part of the 
ODA in 1983, the ODTC is considered to have played a significant role in encouraging orphan 
drug development and is thought to be a necessary incentive in order to ensure continued interest 
in developing orphan drugs.
574
 The ODTC subsidizes the costs of orphan drug development by 
providing a non-refundable tax credit for “up to 50 percent of qualified clinical trial costs related 
to the development of designated orphan drugs”.575 In order to claim clinical testing costs, the 
drug under development must have been designated “orphan” status by the FDA.576  
 As discussed above, investment in orphan drug development increased significantly 
following the introduction of the ODA, and the ODTC is considered to have significantly 
contributed to this by lowering the costs of conducting clinical trials.
577
As the ODTC was 
implemented at the same time as other important incentives for orphan drug development (i.e. 
market exclusivity, orphan drug research grants) it is difficult to accurately gauge the impact of 
the credit alone,
578
 however, a formal assessment of the ODTC estimates that the credit is 
responsible for facilitating up to one third of orphan drug development projects and approvals, 
noting that without the ODTC many companies could not otherwise have afforded to complete 
the drug development process.
579
 Certainty and stability surrounding the ODTC are cited as 
features that make it a particularly effective incentive because, even though tax credits require 
companies to initially make an investment, drug developers can rely on subsequently receiving 
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the benefits.
580
 More will be said about the value of this certainty to drug companies in the 
following section. 
 That being said, the ODTC is not without its limitations. The ODTC is of greater benefit 
to established drug developers (i.e. companies with prior drug approvals and tax liability) than to 
“pre-market companies” (i.e. those without prior drug approvals and no expectation that they 
will have tax liability in the near future).
581
 Pre-market companies still benefit from the ODTC 
but to a lesser extent, particularly as they often have to wait longer before the tax credits can be 
used to off-set tax liability.
582
 As a significant portion of orphan drug R&D activities are being 
completed by less established companies,
583
 this may be an example of how the ODTC, like 
SR&ED, provides the greatest benefit where it is needed the least. 
 Furthermore, tax-based incentives do not affect revenue margins and, therefore, unlike 
market exclusivity, cannot be expected to increase the expected return on a developer’s 
investment.
584
 Therefore, the ODTC seems to be less effective at generating investment for less 
prevalent rare diseases, i.e. diseases that have an especially small pool of potential drug 
consumers and are therefore less potentially profitable than more prevalent diseases.
585
 One 
author suggests that even full subsidization of clinical trial costs will be insufficient to stimulate 
development for particularly rare diseases.
586
 As such, to encourage development for especially 
rare diseases, subsidization (either via tax incentives or direct funding) needs to be paired with 
“revenue-side” incentives that increase profitability of R&D activities.  
6.3  Issues with Tax-Based Incentives for Orphan Drug Innovation in Canada 
 Historically there has been strong criticism about using the tax system for purposes other 
than generating government revenue.
587
 According to the concerns expressed by Surrey, a 
leading tax scholar, tax expenditures that promote innovation can lead to wasted resources and 
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market distortions.
588
 Nevertheless, the Income Tax Act
589
 is currently used to promote a wide 
variety of government policies. Tahk says that many of the original concerns about tax 
expenditures are no longer relevant in light of how they are now structured, (at least in the 
United States context) and that there are distinct advantages to promoting government policies 
via the tax system.
590
 In light of the amount of government spending that is accomplished 
through tax expenditures, one would expect that there are, in fact, sufficient advantages that 
justify such wide-spread use of this policy mechanism. This section describes the implications of 
using the tax system to provide an incentive for R&D in general and orphan drug development in 
particular. 
 This Chapter is not intended as a thorough comparison of tax incentives with direct 
grants, however, because tax-based incentives and grants both function as an incentive by 
subsidizing R&D costs, some degree of comparison with direct funding programs is unavoidable 
throughout the following discussion.  Further, the policy analysis of tax expenditures requires 
investigation into whether the tax system is the optimal means of implementation, which 
necessarily entails some comparison with offering subsidies outside of the tax system.  
6.3.1  “Control” Concerns 
 Using the tax system has implications for the degree of control that policy-makers will be 
able to exercise over an incentive program. Overall, tax expenditures tend to have less frequent 
and less detailed government oversight than other incentive mechanisms, such as direct funding 
programs.
591
 This section, therefore, addresses how using the tax system to provide incentives 
can generate concerns about insufficient government control and oversight. 
 As with market exclusivity and PRVs, tax credits are not cost-free. They are certainly 
“paid for” in the form of lost government revenue. In terms of fairness, it may be appropriate to 
disperse the costs of incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation across all taxpayers in society as 
opposed to placing the burden of paying for an incentive directly on the consumers of orphan 
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drugs (as market exclusivity does) or drug consumers more generally (as PRVs would do), and 
any third party who ultimately pays for those drugs.
592
 Unlike direct spending programs, tax-
based incentives do not have a pre-determined government spending limit and therefore can 
become incredibly expensive for the government and, in turn, taxpayers.
593
 While there is 
typically a maximum amount that any individual taxpayer may claim, the total amount of money 
that a tax expenditure will cost in a given year can only be roughly estimated. Consequentially, 
the government may end up spending more in support of R&D activity than is truly justified, 
with little ability to curb this expenditure. However, this factor merely gives some context to the 
rest of the analysis. A significant cost may, in fact, be reasonable in circumstances where there is 
a strong justification for the tax expenditure (such as the unmet medical needs of patients with 
rare diseases) and the incentive being offered is actually effective in achieving its objectives. As 
discussed above, SR&ED is perceived to be very costly and efforts have been made to reduce 
SR&ED spending.
594
 A targeted, orphan-specific tax incentive would, of course, be less 
expensive than the SR&ED program because it would be available for a significantly smaller 
subset of R&D activities. As the costs of a tax credit for orphan drug development expenses 
would be dispersed across all Canadian taxpayers, the resulting positive impact on public health 
could justify this collective burden. Increasing available treatments would likely generate 
improved health outcomes, resulting in more patients and their families being able to return to 
and/or contribute more to the workforce and, consequently, contribute more to paying for orphan 
drug incentives through their income taxes.   
 A second important aspect of tax expenditures is that, once implemented, they tend to 
enjoy a level of stability that is generally not afforded to other government programs.
595
 This has 
been suggested as one of the most powerful arguments in favour of using tax expenditures to 
                                                          
592
 Nussim & Sorak, supra note 545 at 47-48. 
593
 A concern also noted by Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report 3 Tax-Based 
Expenditures (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2015) (“tax expenditures are not 
subject to a spending limit authorized by Parliament and may put pressure on the federal 
government’s finances” at 6). 
594
 At 97-98.  
595
 At least in the American context (see e.g. Tahk, supra note 590 at 88), though a report from 
the Auditor General of Canada also noted that, unlike direct program spending, tax-based 
expenditures are not required to be annually approved by Parliament or be the subject of 
expenditure reviews. (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, supra note 584 at 12).  
104 
 
promote R&D activity.
596
 This stability is related to the lack of regulatory oversight given to tax-
based incentives, compared with other incentive programs.
597
  Tax incentives tend to be more 
stable and permanent than grant programs because they are not typically subject to annual budget 
reviews, which may mean that tax incentives are more likely to lead to behaviour adjustments 
than a grant program that could undergo dramatic changes on a yearly basis.
598
 While direct 
funding schemes can be thought of as more predictable in the sense that they permit a company 
to receive financial support before an R&D project has even been commenced, this predictability 
is relatively short-lived; SR&ED is firmly ensconced in the Canadian tax system, which 
facilitates planning of R&D investment and activities over the long-term. Given that drug 
development often takes over a decade, a tax incentive that can be relied upon throughout that 
time facilitates planning of the development process better than a direct funding program that is 
subject to annual review, amendments, and possible termination. 
  While not necessarily a disadvantage per se, the stability of tax expenditures certainly 
permits reasonable concerns about the extent to which public resources are being spent via the 
tax system to encourage innovation. Some authors suggest that, with respect to R&D tax 
incentives, “unless there is a clear conviction that policies implemented via tax expenditures 
merit an immunity not granted to other R&D assistance programs, the result is an unnecessary 
abrogation of policy leadership.”599 Given how much government spending is provided via 
SR&ED one could reasonably argue that the program should be regularly evaluated. Being set 
within the tax system makes SR&ED difficult to regularly assess; however, increased oversight 
by government actors, in and of itself, is not necessarily desirable. A lack of regular scrutiny is 
merely a potential concern with tax expenditures in general and may not actually operate as a 
disadvantage with respect to SR&ED or an orphan drug-specific tax credit. Regular evaluation 
also requires significant government resources to accomplish and whether frequent assessment is 
worth it to ensure that a program continues to function as intended will vary by program. Careful 
policy planning could reduce the need to regularly assess a subsidy because if its provisions have 
been sufficiently well thought out the government will retain a sufficient amount of control over 
its spending. A tax incentive targeting orphan drug development would have the advantage, for 
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policymakers, of specifically directing the pharmaceutical industry toward socially valuable 
innovative efforts, while also affording drug companies a degree of predictability that is not 
often available through direct funding programs.  
 Furthermore, as a supply-side incentive, tax benefits are available “up-front”; in other 
words, companies receive the subsidy prior to product approval. For drug companies, this is an 
especially important advantage of tax incentives and other push mechanisms because they can 
rely on receiving the benefit regardless of whether or not the R&D activities they invest in 
ultimately yield a marketable product. Supply-side incentives are considered to be effective 
because they are available throughout the process of R&D, which is precisely the time when 
expenses are high.
600
 Revenue-side incentives, such as PRVs and market exclusivity, “suffer 
from time-inconsistency”, 601 whereby incentives that are not awarded until the completion of 
R&D activities are associated with decreased certainty and the possibility that the incentive will 
no longer be available once a drug developer has an eligible product.
 
Recall that this has been 
noted as a short-coming of the PRV programs.
602
 Uncertainty about whether a project will yield a 
marketable product combined with the enormous expense of the drug development process might 
strongly discourage companies from investing in R&D.
603
 On the other hand, there is no 
guarantee that the costs of the tax expenditure will result in “successful” drug development, and 
some concern has been expressed that supply-side incentives allows for potentially wasteful 
government spending because there is no guarantee that a product will be successfully 
developed.
604
 Nevertheless, for some pharmaceutical companies supply-side incentives like tax 
credits may be the only way they will be able to complete (or even begin) the drug development 
process. The cost of greater certainty and perhaps, therefore, greater impact, may be some waste 
in the form of funding being paid for research activities that ultimately do not result in a 
marketable product. Furthermore, “unsuccessful” drug development is arguably still socially 
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valuable because it can add to the knowledge base of the broader scientific and pharmaceutical 
industry.
605
  
6.3.2  Effectiveness and Impact of Tax Incentives 
 While tax incentives are available throughout the drug development process, they also 
require that a company make the initial investment in a development project in order to receive 
the subsidy.  In other words, while the money is available sooner than under revenue-side 
incentives, it may not be soon enough for some companies.  Smaller or otherwise less financially 
stable companies may not be able to make that initial investment and, therefore, be unable to take 
advantage of tax-based incentives.
606
 R&D tax incentives seem to primarily assist firms that are 
not operating under significant financial constraints.
607
 As noted by one author, “tax incentives 
as a policy tool toward R&D are most effective when they are least necessary and may influence 
those firms who need them the least.”608 Particularly for small, start-up enterprises, the 
requirement to pay up-front may be detrimental to their innovative potential and therefore basing 
an orphan drug incentive in the tax system operates as a disadvantage to the extent that it does 
not facilitate R&D efforts from companies that do not have sufficient capital to start or continue 
with a project. Arguably, the issue of requiring businesses to make an initial investment can be 
addressed through direct funding schemes,
609
 though companies could face similar difficulty in 
obtaining assistance in this manner, depending on the eligibility criteria, because of uncertainty 
around a project’s feasibility.  
 As mentioned previously, a common concern about tax expenditures is that they can 
create an “upside-down” effect whereby tax benefits are worth more to those who have more 
money, an issue that has been referenced with respect to both SR&ED and the ODTC.
610
 Some 
authors have suggested that upside-down effects are particularly problematic in the case of R&D 
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tax incentives because newer companies may not have sufficient tax liability or profitability to 
benefit from the credit when they are just starting out, but these may be the companies that are 
most deserving of assistance.
611
 The upside-down effect can be mitigated to the extent that 
refundable, instead of non-refundable, tax credits are used because the value of refundable 
credits is not dependent on a taxpayer having tax liability.
612
 This effect is in fact reduced to 
some extent in Canada because small CCPCs are able to receive refundable credits. However, 
SR&ED has been accused of being “woefully ineffective for publicly traded tech companies”613 
that are not eligible for refundable credits, a complaint that is underscored by the fact that in 
2007 only 4% of SR&ED benefits were received by small non-CCPCs.
614
 In any event, the use 
of refundable credits for orphan drug development is not recommended as this would greatly 
increase government spending in a manner that is not necessarily justified by an equally 
significant impact on public health outcomes. On the other hand, the additional costs associated 
with providing a refundable credit could be reduced by providing the credit at a lower rate (e.g. 
35 percent instead of 50).
615
 
 An alternative arrangement that warrants further consideration has been suggested by 
Valverde, Reed, and Schulman.
616
 Their proposed “grant-and-access” program would give 
companies the choice between a tax credit and a direct research grant (subject to a price cap on 
the orphan drug).
617
 Such a program would offer an additional means of subsidizing orphan drug 
development while addressing the uneven distributional effects observed with the ODTC in the 
United States. One significant limitation on this alternative is that it requires a “robust” grant 
program be set up, in order to sufficiently subsidize development costs.
618
 As will be discussed 
                                                          
611
 Bozeman & Link, supra note 542 at 27.  
612
 Tahk, supra note 590 at 78. 
613
 Wahl, supra note 566. 
614
 Expert Panel Report, supra note 129 at 3-9 (in 2007 56% of SR&ED benefits went to large 
businesses and 40% went to small CCPCs). Of course, the advantage of having minimal to no 
refundable credits is the reduced government spending. Additionally, non-refundable credits can 
be carried forward so the benefit is not altogether lost.  
615
 The author thanks Professor Tamara Larre for this suggestion. 
616
 “Proposed ‘Grant-And-Access’ Program With Price Caps Could Stimulate Development Of 
Drugs For Very Rare Diseases” (2012) 31 Health Aff 2528. 
617
 Ibid at 2530. 
618
 Ibid at 2531. 
108 
 
in greater detail below,
619
 it may not be politically feasible to introduce a large direct funding 
scheme for orphan drug development in Canada. 
 As already discussed, the complexity of tax provisions can contribute to undesirable 
distributional effects as well. This issue would likely be less of a concern with respect to an 
orphan drug-specific tax incentive because companies undertaking R&D in the pharmaceutical 
field are more likely to be equipped to accurately identify qualifying research activities. Even 
small pharmaceutical companies can be expected to realize that their activities are eligible for an 
orphan drug tax credit. Given the importance of maintaining detailed and accurate research 
documents in order to gain regulatory approval, it is also likely that having the records required 
to successfully claim the tax credit will present very little difficulty for companies engaged in 
pharmaceutical research.   
 Finally, with respect to the ability of tax incentives to bring about the desired changes in 
behaviour (i.e. to get pharmaceutical companies investing in developing orphan drugs), as 
discussed above, the ODTC appears to be effective only to a certain extent.
620
 Less prevalent 
diseases are less likely to receive attention from the pharmaceutical industry, even when the 
costs of drug development are being subsidized.
621
 This finding highlights the importance of 
having both supply-side and revenue-side incentives; supply-side incentives will make it easier 
for a company to carry out R&D and see the development process through to completion while 
revenue-side incentives may be necessary to encourage companies to invest in drug development 
projects that would otherwise be unprofitable.
622
 Although not without its problems, a similar 
orphan drug-specific credit in Canada may complement a Canadian market exclusivity regime. 
6.3.3  Implementation Costs 
 Government subsidization of research can be accomplished in a number of manners, 
either directly, such as through research grants, or indirectly as with tax credits. One final issue 
about a tax credit to facilitate orphan drug development remains to be considered and that is 
whether a tax agency is well-suited to administering an orphan drug incentive or, more 
specifically, whether a tax agency represents the optimal policy means to provide an orphan drug 
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subsidy. An orphan drug tax credit will involve the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) in 
administering what is essentially a health policy. This is not necessarily a problem per se, but 
does warrant further consideration because the institution, or agency, that is tasked with 
administering a program has implications for the design and accuracy of the program; some 
agencies are better suited to administering a particular program and may therefore be able to do 
so more cheaply and accurately than another agency.
623
  
 Incentives that are based in the tax system often have characteristics that differentiate 
them from direct spending programs, but these differences may simply be a matter of how these 
programs are typically designed. Arguably, both tax expenditures and cash-based transfers 
(“CBTs”) can “always be redesigned in an equivalent manner”624 so as to “take the same form 
and be contingent on the same variables” 625 and therefore “generate identical effects on 
behaviour”.626 Where CBTs and tax-based incentives may actually differ is with respect to 
implementation costs, political constraints, and international commitments.
627
 Therefore, 
decisions about whether to use a direct or indirect means of providing a subsidy should involve a 
consideration of the implementation costs associated with each agency.  
 Implementation costs refer to the capital (human, tangible, intangible, or financial) that is 
needed to apply the rules that govern the allocation of the subsidy.
628
 With respect to programs 
that are intended to encourage innovation, assessments have to be made about what qualifies as 
innovative activity in order to ensure that government subsidization is only being granted for 
appropriate activities (i.e. those for which public spending is justified).
629
 In order to avoid undue 
implementation costs when making these assessments, the agency tasked with administering a 
program needs to possess a sufficient degree of expertise in the incentive program’s subject 
matter.
630
 Weisbach & Nussim discuss an “integration theory”, which posits that whether a 
government program should be implemented as a part of the tax system depends on the extent to 
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which the program’s function complements the functions that are already performed by the tax 
system.
631
 Integration theory suggests that if the areas that the CRA already specializes in 
involve skills that are necessary to implement a particular program, then integrating that program 
into the tax system would be advantageous.
632
 Innovation incentives require knowledge of 
scientific or technological matters; an incentive for orphan drugs requires an even narrower area 
of expertise.
633
  Tax agencies do not inherently possess this specialized expertise, nor is it 
necessarily desirable for tax agencies to develop expertise in scientific and technological matters 
because such expertise is not otherwise complementary to administering the other tasks of a tax 
agency (i.e. measuring and assessing means to pay, etc).
634
 According to integration theory, 
R&D incentives will incur high implementation costs when administered by the tax agency 
(because the tax agency will have to develop or out-source the necessary expertise) and 
therefore, tax incentives for innovation should be redesigned as CBTs and the task of 
administering these programs allocated to another agency.
635
 With respect to an incentive 
program that specifically promotes orphan drug development, a drug regulatory agency would be 
better suited to administering it because it already has the expertise required to design, monitor 
and enforce the rules, and doing so complements the other activities of that agency.
636
 
 The definition of “scientific research and experimental development” used to determine 
an eligible expense under SR&ED does involve a degree of scientific or technological 
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knowledge on the part of CRA.
637
  In response to criticism about SR&ED’s complexity and the 
associated problems with making a successful claim, CRA has introduced a number of support 
services including the First-Time Claimant Advisory Service and Pre-claim Project Review.
638
 
Empirical evidence is needed to make any conclusive statement but it is reasonable to question 
whether it really is efficient to introduce these services into the tax system. These seem to be 
non-tax-related administrative tasks that would be better left to a different government agency. 
Tax agencies specialize in “observing, measuring, and enforcing ability-related variables such as 
income, expenses, family structure, business entities, financial instruments, etc.”639 CRA’s 
support services for SR&ED claimants require expertise that is not otherwise related to the other 
activities of the agency.
640
 
 With respect to a broad incentive program like SR&ED it is not clear which government 
agency should administer it, and, given this breadth, they may not be another government agency 
in Canada that would be an obvious candidate to administer an equivalent program. However, an 
orphan drug-specific incentive program allows for a more straightforward application of the 
integration theory that was discussed above. Orphan drug policy is of course a public health 
policy and perhaps “health-related innovation, for example, should be entirely managed by the 
Department of Health, which enjoys the necessary scientific expertise, economies of scope with 
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its other health-related activities, and low intra-agency coordination costs”.641 The CRA does not 
specialize in identifying what constitutes qualified clinical trial costs, or what qualifies as an 
orphan drug. Health Canada is likely to be better suited to this task because the agency already 
possesses the specialized knowledge regarding orphan drugs and clinical testing, and identifying 
eligible activities (i.e. clinical trials for designated orphan drugs) relates to the other activities of 
that agency. A tax-based incentive for orphan drug development would fail to take advantage of 
Health Canada’s existing expertise in that subject matter. As such, the theory would suggest that 
an orphan drug subsidy should be administered by Health Canada rather than the CRA. 
 On the other hand, as the CRA already administers SR&ED, a tax credit for orphan drug 
development could reasonably be added to their tasks with relatively little additional burden to 
the agency. Drug developers in Canada already make use of SR&ED benefits,
642
 and there would 
be minimal additional compliance costs for them in claiming an orphan drug tax credit. Having 
an orphan drug subsidy in the tax system would also have the advantages associated with yearly 
filing. Specifically, annual filing of taxes can increase awareness, and therefore take-up, of the 
program,
643
 and offers companies a convenient way to apply for the subsidy.
644
   
 Furthermore, while implementation costs provide one basis for deciding how to provide a 
subsidy, the political costs are also acknowledged as a means to distinguish between essentially 
equivalent programs.
645
 An incentive that stands no reasonable chance of being implemented 
cannot be expected to have an impact on orphan drug development. Directly funding orphan 
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drug development may be politically unfeasible in light of the public controversy over the high 
prices for orphan drugs and pharmaceutical companies that “game” the system by exploiting 
loopholes in orphan drug policies. For better or worse, the voting public perceives tax 
expenditures to be less costly than direct grants even in the face of information that says 
otherwise.
646
 The political popularity that tax incentives typically enjoy relative to direct 
spending programs, combined with the concerns about orphan drug prices, may mean that the tax 
system will be the only way policymakers could actually get an orphan drug subsidy 
implemented. Assuming that some subsidization of orphan drug development is necessary, a tax-
based program that could be introduced without insurmountable opposition may in fact be a 
better policy choice than a direct funding program that would attract significant opposition.  
6.4 Summary 
 This Chapter leads to the conclusion that an orphan drug subsidy should be implemented 
in the form of an orphan-specific tax credit. This incentive, unlike market exclusivity, will have 
the advantage of lowering the costs of drug development and may therefore permit R&D activity 
that could not occur without the additional assistance from the government. A commitment to 
equality makes it fair to widely disperse the costs of a tax-based subsidy across all Canadian 
citizens, as orphan drug development is likely to have broader societal benefits.  Furthermore, 
the ODTC used by the United States has a sufficiently narrow window of eligibility that the cost 
of such a program in Canada would be relatively modest. The limitations of a tax credit or 
indeed, any subsidy for drug development, reinforce the importance of using the tax system in 
conjunction with a revenue-side incentive such as market exclusivity that will be able to further 
encourage companies to development and market orphan drugs.  Finally, while this discussion 
found that an orphan drug development subsidization program would be more appropriately 
administered by Health Canada as a direct funding program, the high costs of orphan drugs and 
controversy of orphan drug policies place political constraints on the choice of policy mechanism 
that cannot be ignored. CRA is already involved in administering a research-based incentive 
(SR&ED) and tax expenditures tend to be politically popular relative to direct funding schemes, 
thus making it more likely that a tax expenditure would be a preferred policy instrument. Given 
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the importance of providing some form of subsidy, a tax credit, as a “second best” option, will 
have to suffice.   
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Rare diseases historically created a market failure where the costs of developing a drug to 
treat a small number of people are likely to outweigh the expected return on investment to the 
developer. Diseases of low prevalence can also create unique challenges for drug developers 
with respect to obtaining a sufficiently workable understanding of the progress of a given disease 
and conducting clinical trials for relatively few patients who may be widely dispersed across a 
jurisdiction. As a result, these diseases were ignored, or “orphaned”, by the pharmaceutical 
industry. Orphan drug frameworks have been enacted in a number of jurisdictions in order to 
address this problem.  The United States has led the way for orphan drug policies and its ODA, 
enacted in 1983, is generally hailed as a successful policy move. The number of treatments being 
developed for rare diseases increased dramatically following the enactment of the ODA and the 
Act is frequently cited as having had a significant impact on public health. A similar policy was 
subsequently implemented in the European Union; Australia, Singapore, Japan, and Taiwan also 
have orphan drug legislation that provide incentives to varying degrees. Orphan drug incentives 
have, in concert with other factors, made orphan drugs a more profitable and attractive 
investment for drug companies. This thesis sought to evaluate three orphan drug incentives with 
the goal of understanding how well they could be expected to operate in Canada and to identify 
whether it would be advisable to modify how they are currently being used in other jurisdictions.  
 In the 1990s a Canadian orphan drug policy was rejected as being unnecessary, largely on 
the basis of two reasons: one, that Canadian patients can use the SAP to apply for access to 
medicines that are not yet approved in Canada and, two, low levels of pharmaceutical innovation 
in Canada were taken to imply that orphan drug incentives would be unlikely to have an impact 
in any event due to lack of capacity. Nevertheless, with no orphan drug framework in place, 
Canadian patients with rare diseases can face additional challenges with respect to accessing 
treatment. With nothing that encourages companies to market their orphan drug products here, 
developers of orphan drugs tend to delay obtaining market authorisation in Canada, if they do so 
at all. Unapproved drugs that are accessed through the SAP are not usually covered by healthcare 
plans with the result that patients with rare diseases often have to pay for them. This puts patients 
with rare diseases at a disadvantage relative to those with more common diseases.  
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 Government interventions that address market failures are often considered valid public 
policy. Further justification for providing orphan drug incentives may be found in the “rule of 
rescue” line of reasoning, whereby a disproportionate allocation of resources can be considered 
acceptable public policy in order to “rescue” a small group of people. Many orphan diseases are 
serious to life-threatening in nature and are frequently suffered by children; these are 
circumstances that make the argument in favour of providing orphan drug incentives all the more 
compelling.  It could even be argued that Canada has a legal obligation to promote development 
and access to orphan drugs through various policy mechanisms. At the very least, it is reasonable 
to argue that Canada should provide incentives that will encourage drug companies to market 
their orphan drugs here in a more timely manner in order to relieve the current barriers to 
treatment faced by rare disease patients relative to patients with more common disorders.   
 That being said, it is not entirely clear how “orphan” status should be determined, and 
how the resources associated with that designation should be allocated. Increasingly vocal 
concerns about wildly expensive orphan drugs also highlight the importance of careful policy 
planning. The success of orphan drug policies is tempered by the outstanding issues of 
availability and affordable access. In acknowledgment of the concerns about exploitation of 
orphan drug policies and undue strain on public healthcare budgets as a result of increased 
stratification of disease subsets, it is recommended that careful consideration be given to the 
definition of “orphan”. Rarity alone may not be sufficient to justify the provision of incentives 
and it may be more appropriate for a Canadian orphan drug framework to take disease severity, 
or some additional criteria, into consideration. Without seeking to conclusively state how 
“orphan” should be defined, in all likelihood factors in addition to disease prevalence should be 
included in Canada’s “orphan drug” definition.  
 Market exclusivity may be the most powerful incentive offered through orphan drug 
policies and, unsurprisingly, the above evaluation arrived at the conclusion that it should be 
introduced in Canada as part of an orphan drug framework. The relatively narrow scope of 
protection combined with the strength of the protection (due to how exclusivity is enforced) 
would address both public policy concerns and perceived shortcomings of patent law. The 
requirements that an invention must be novel and inventive can result in what is perceived to be 
an under-protection of a drug developer’s investment and, therefore, patent protection is not 
necessarily sufficient to encourage valuable drug development to a satisfactory degree. 
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Furthermore, the subjective nature of the patent application process results in an indeterminacy 
that can further impair the impact that patent regimes can have on drug development. Market 
exclusivity, as it is offered in the United States and the European Union, provides a degree of 
certainty and predictability that is not available under patent schemes, and may therefore operate 
more effectively as an incentive for drug development in general.  
 Market exclusivity likely functions as a strong incentive for pharmaceutical companies to 
invest in developing and marketing rare disease drugs, however, the incentive does not appear to 
be sufficiently targeted from a public policy perspective with the result that patients with less 
prevalent rare diseases are still without approved treatments. This issue needs to be addressed 
beyond the level of any individual incentive (i.e. in identifying the drugs that should be eligible 
for incentives in the first place). The high cost of drugs that are approved for rare diseases creates 
an additional barrier to patient access, but it is debateable whether market exclusivity is the 
primary cause of these high prices. To an extent, the costs of developing a drug will dictate what 
companies need to charge for an orphan drug, but at the very least it can be acknowledged that 
exclusivity protection does little to alleviate the cost concerns.  
 Concerns about sky-rocketing prices for orphan drugs are not unwarranted, and scientific 
advances in the field of pharmacogenomics are such that Canadian policymakers should make 
some modifications to how the United States and European Union have drafted the rules 
governing exclusivity. In recognition that a small market can make it difficult to profit from 
orphan drug development, providing a longer period of protection may partly address concerns 
about affordable access because companies would have a longer period of time during which 
they can rely on market protection. At the very least, it is not recommended that exclusivity be 
provided for only a few years because this would likely put pressure on companies to increase 
prices in an effort to make a profit in a much more limited timeframe. Including the ability to 
terminate the exclusivity period once an orphan drug has become “sufficiently profitable” is 
recommended in order to avoid prolonged application of an incentive where it is no longer 
necessary. That being said, the term “sufficiently profitable” must be clearly defined and should 
take into consideration the additional indications for which an orphan drug is approved, at least 
those that are bio-marker-defined subsets of the original orphan condition. The potential to 
extinguish exclusivity protection once it appears no longer justifiable could hopefully quell 
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public concerns about orphan drug policies being vulnerable to exploitation by pharmaceutical 
companies.  
 Implementing market exclusivity along with a European Union-inspired provision 
allowing for the exclusivity period to be prematurely extinguished once a drug becomes 
“sufficiently profitable”, as suggested above, would make the incentive somewhat more closely 
related to the actual risks and costs incurred in developing a drug. In theory, the potential to 
terminate the exclusivity protection could weaken the market exclusivity as an incentive in the 
eyes of pharmaceutical companies. On the other hand, such a provision could be more clearly 
worded to allow it to be known in advance roughly how and when that clause would be applied, 
thereby tempering any concerns that exclusivity would be taken away too early or without just 
cause. This solution will of course require companies to be more forthcoming and transparent 
about their R&D investments and marketing expenditures to be effective, and Health Canada’s 
experience of administering its NOC/c program suggests that care should be taken to ensure that 
the agency is able to adequately assess profitability and respond accordingly (i.e. by terminating 
market exclusivity).  
 Public controversy over orphan drug prices and incentives in general may have a 
detrimental effect on Canadian patients with rare diseases. Allocation of public resources, as 
would be required to provide orphan drug incentives, should be done in a manner that reflects the 
values and priorities of society as a whole. If the public perceives orphan drug incentives to be 
overly generous toward drug developers, or otherwise unnecessary, then patients with rare 
diseases in Canada will continue to be disadvantaged. In order to smooth the path for an orphan 
drug framework to be enacted in Canada, policymakers should be proactive in their efforts to 
prevent exploitation by the pharmaceutical industry (i.e. through careful wording of the 
definition for “orphan drug”) and to tie the provision of incentives to a positive impact on public 
health outcomes. This applies to all potential incentives but probably more so to market 
exclusivity because it is seen as such a powerful and valuable incentive, whereas vouchers are 
perceived to be of uncertain and insufficient value and tax credits, as a supply-side incentive, 
simply operate differently (by lowering the costs of R&D rather than increasing the profits of 
doing so). 
 The possibility to terminate exclusivity protection, combined with regulation that would 
“add up” profitability of the drug as a treatment for related disease subsets will help to address 
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concerns about misuse of orphan drug incentives, particularly if these provisions successfully 
encourage companies not to set unreasonably high prices.  While the recommendation to provide 
longer market exclusivity periods is unlikely to garner strong political support, including the 
possibility of ending market protection for “sufficiently profitable” drugs should alleviate the 
anticipated initial resistance to this. For this reason it is especially important to flesh out the term 
“sufficiently profitable”; doing so will give the provision real meaning and avoid the appearance 
of being an empty threat. As the provision to shorten the exclusivity period has never been used 
in the European Union this would be a legitimate concern, one that Canadian policymakers can 
avoid by elaborating on the meaning of “sufficiently profitable” and giving clear guidance about 
when and how it will be applied.  
 Priority review vouchers, while a unique and interesting incentive, are not recommended 
as part of an orphan drug framework in Canada. There are outstanding questions about the safety 
of “vouchered” drugs and the additional burden that will be placed on the review agency when a 
voucher is redeemed. Furthermore, the value of vouchers remains uncertain and, in any event, is 
arguably always going to be a weak influence on decisions about drug development. Although 
vouchers may be insufficient to act as the catalyst for a drug’s development, they may provide a 
sufficient financial incentive to allow smaller companies to attract the investment they need to 
complete the development process. Safety concerns about drugs that are reviewed via Health 
Canada’s priority review mechanism and legitimate questions about the agency’s ability to meet 
its review targets even without the additional burden that would be imposed by a voucher 
program should be sufficient to conclude that it would be inappropriate to implement a PRV 
program in Canada at this time. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Canada has a 
significantly smaller population than the United States, and therefore, presumably, represents a 
smaller market for blockbuster drugs. As the impact of voucher programs comes from the value 
of accelerating a blockbuster drug to market, this value (which is already questionable in the 
United States) surely would be insufficient in the Canadian context to have an impact on drug 
development and marketing decisions. 
 While recognizing the importance of having a revenue-side incentive such as market 
exclusivity, the need to subsidize the costs of orphan drug development cannot be overlooked. 
Therefore, an orphan drug-specific tax credit should be introduced in Canada. Subsidies, tax-
based or otherwise, have been demonstrated to be an effective means of achieving policy 
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objectives. Canada already provides a tax-based subsidy for R&D activity with its SR&ED 
program. However, this program is not specifically directed at orphan drug development. The 
United States, on the other hand, uses an orphan drug-specific tax credit in addition to its general 
R&D tax expenditure. The ODTC is considered to be a valuable and necessary part of orphan 
drug policy in the United States. Restricting eligible expenses to “qualified clinical testing costs” 
for orphan drug development projects would result in a program that is sufficiently narrow so as 
to keep the cost of a Canadian orphan drug subsidy reasonable. 
 No matter how “off-budget” or indirect the government costs may seem, providing 
incentives for drug development will always come at a price. It is not obvious who should bear 
the costs of providing orphan drug incentives. Where a commitment to equality provides a strong 
justification for having orphan drug incentives it is, therefore, also appropriate to disperse (at 
least partly) the costs of an incentive broadly across all (tax-paying) members of a society, as a 
tax-based incentive would do. Using the tax system places the costs of an orphan drug 
development incentive on taxpayers in general, as opposed to drug consumers (and any third 
party payer) of either orphan drugs (as is the case with market exclusivity) or blockbuster drugs 
(that have been accelerated to the market by a PRV). The improved treatment options that would 
hopefully result from such an incentive could subsequently bring about improved health 
outcomes for rare disease patients. Significant improvements in the health of these patients could 
result in cost savings to the public health care system and increased economic contributions from 
the treated patients and their caregivers.  
 Tax-based subsidies for R&D have several distinct benefits for pharmaceutical 
companies. Once introduced, tax expenditures tend to be stable relative to other funding schemes 
that often undergo regular review and potential changes. This offers pharmaceutical companies a 
degree of predictability that enables them to plan and invest in drug development accordingly.  
On the other hand, the lack of regular scrutiny does call for careful drafting, implementation, and 
discipline in government-prompted review of effectiveness. 
 For pharmaceutical companies, the importance of supply-side incentives cannot be 
overstated.  As such, they may be a necessary component of an orphan drug policy because they 
can enable companies to undertake R&D projects that could not otherwise afford to in the 
absence of such assistance. While the fact that SR&ED and ODTC benefits are paid out 
regardless of whether the subsidized activity is ultimately successful (i.e. by resulting in a 
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marketable product) may elicit concerns about wasteful government spending, for many 
companies the high costs of drug development will often require such up-front government 
spending. Many companies will simply be unable to undertake orphan drug development 
projects in the absence of subsidization.  While the money may not flow as quickly as would be 
optimal where the company must wait for a profitable tax year, a tax credit will yield benefits 
more quickly than revenue-side incentives such as market exclusivity. Furthermore, even 
apparently unsuccessful drug development, like other R&D, can produce spill-overs of 
knowledge that ultimately benefit society in any event. 
 While Canada’s general R&D tax program, SR&ED, is the subject of criticism regarding 
the distributional consequences of the program, such concerns would exist to a lesser degree, if 
at all, with an orphan drug tax credit. Smaller, less sophisticated companies in Canada have cited 
the complexity of SR&ED provisions as creating difficulty with identifying eligible activities 
and successfully claiming expenses. The breadth of SR&ED’s scope undoubtedly creates 
confusion over what qualifies; an orphan drug tax credit for “qualified clinical testing costs” 
would be unlikely to generate such uncertainty. Furthermore, difficulties with maintaining the 
documentation required to support a claim, observed with the SR&ED program, will not be faced 
by drug developers because the clinical trial process already requires meticulous record-keeping.  
 That being said, an orphan drug tax credit in Canada will admittedly suffer from similar 
uneven distributional effects that are observed with the ODTC in the United States, where larger, 
more established firms receive a greater benefit from non-refundable tax credits because they are 
able to use them immediately to off-set current tax liability. While refundable credits can ensure 
a more even distribution of the tax benefit, unless the credit rate was reduced accordingly, a 
refundable orphan drug credit is not recommended because it would increase the cost of the 
program. Uneven distributional effects could be also addressed by directly funding orphan drug 
development in lieu of using the tax system. Furthermore, an orphan drug subsidy is arguably 
better suited to being administered by Health Canada, which already possesses expertise in 
classifying diseases and the clinical trial process. However, introducing large-scale research 
grant schemes for orphan drug development is unlikely to be a popular policy choice with the 
voting public and therefore a tax-based incentive is still the recommended means for subsidizing 
orphan drug development in Canada. Further, there is the potential for administrative cost 
savings for the government and taxpayers by implementing the subsidy though the existing 
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income tax system. An orphan drug tax credit would not create unreasonable resource demands 
on CRA, as the agency already administers the SR&ED program.  As such, an orphan drug tax 
credit is a recommended component, in addition to market exclusivity, of any orphan drug 
framework implemented in Canada.  
 With lower rates of pharmaceutical innovation and a significantly smaller market it is 
unlikely that any orphan drug incentive in Canada would have as dramatic of an impact as the 
incentives appear to have had in the United States. At the date of writing, it is unclear if a 
Canadian orphan drug policy will be pursued again in the near future. Nevertheless, offering 
market exclusivity to foreign drug developers could have facilitated rare disease patients in 
accessing orphan drugs without the additional cost and burden of using the SAP, and a tax credit 
for orphan drug development would have been a convenient means of encouraging valuable drug 
development here, without incurring too great of a cost to Canadian taxpayers. Given that there 
are ongoing challenges faced by patients with rare diseases in Canada it is hoped that some 
measures will nevertheless be taken to encourage companies to obtain Health Canada approval 
for orphan drugs. For example, Health Canada could waive the application fees for a second 
(non-orphan) New Drug Submission for companies that obtain market approval of a qualifying 
orphan drug here (i.e. a slightly different take on the PRV programs). Alternatively, some form 
of a tax break could be offered to companies that market their orphan drug(s) in Canada.
647
 In 
any event, any future discussions about a Canadian orphan drug framework could benefit from 
taking into account the issues with orphan drug incentives described in this thesis.  
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